The Pietas Reader

Classical Antiquity

Xenophon

Translated by E. C. Marchant & O. J. Todd, 1923

Memorabilia

[It] is…irrational to seek the guidance of heaven in matters which men are permitted by the gods to decide for themselves by study: to ask, for instance, Is it better to get an experienced coachman to drive my carriage or a man without experience? Is it better to get an experienced seaman to steer my ship or a man without experience?

So too with what we may know by reckoning, measurement or weighing.

To put such questions to the gods seemed to his mind profane. In short, what the gods have granted us to do by help of learning, we must learn...

His own conversation was ever of human things. The problems he discussed were, What is godly, what is ungodly; what is beautiful, what is ugly; what is just, what is unjust; what is prudence, what is madness; what is courage, what is cowardice; what is a state, what is a statesman; what is government, and what is a governor;—these and others like them, of which the knowledge made a "gentleman," in his estimation, while ignorance should involve the reproach of " slavishness.”

No less wonderful is it to me that some believed the charge brought against Socrates of corrupting the youth. In the first place, apart from what I have said, in control of his own passions and appetites he was the strictest of men; further, in endurance of cold and heat and every kind of toil he was most resolute; and besides, his needs were so schooled to moderation that having very little he was yet very content. Such was his own character: how then can he have led others into impiety, crime, gluttony, lust, or sloth? On the contrary, he cured these vices in many, by putting into them a desire for goodness, and by giving them confidence that self-discipline would make them gentlemen. To be sure he never professed to teach this; but, by letting his own light shine, he led his disciples to hope that they through imitation of him would attain to such excellence. Furthermore, he himself never neglected the body, and reproved such neglect in others. Thus over-eating followed by over-exertion he disapproved. But he approved of taking as much hard exercise as is agreeable to the soul; for the habit not only insured good health, but did not hamper the care of the soul. On the other hand, he disliked foppery and pretentiousness in the fashion of clothes or shoes or in behaviour. Nor, again, did he encourage love of money in his companions. For while he checked their other desires, he would not make money himself out of their desire for his companionship. He held that this self-denying ordinance insured his liberty. Those who charged a fee for their society he denounced for selling themselves into bondage; since they were bound to converse with all from whom they took the fee. He marvelled that anyone should make money by the profession of virtue, and should not reflect that his highest reward would be the gain of a good friend; as though he who became a true gentleman could tail to feel deep gratitude for a benefit so great. Socrates indeed never promised any such boon to anyone; but he was confident that those of his companions who adopted his principles of conduct would throughout life be good friends to him and to one another.

But I hold that they who cultivate wisdom and think they will be able to guide the people in prudent policy never lapse into violence: they know that enmities and dangers are inseparable from violence, but persuasion produces the same results safely and amicably. For violence, by making its victims sensible of loss, rouses their hatred: but persuasion, by seeming to confer a favour, wins good will. It is not, then, cultivation of wisdom that leads to violent methods, but the possession of power without prudence.

Besides, many supporters are necessary to him who ventures to use force: but he who can persuade needs no confederate, having confidence in his own unaided power of persuasion. And such a man has no occasion to shed blood; for who would rather take a man's life than have a live and willing follower?

I notice that as those who do not train the body cannot perform the functions proper to the body, so those who do not train the soul cannot perform the functions of the soul: for they cannot do what they ought to do nor avoid what they ought not to do.

For this cause fathers try to keep their sons, even if they are prudent lads, out of bad company: for the society of honest men is a training in virtue, but the society of the bad is virtue's undoing.

As one of the poets says: "From the good shalt thou learn good things; but if thou minglest with the bad thou shalt lose even what thou hast of wisdom."

And another says: "Ah, but good man is at one time noble, at another base.”

My testimony agrees with theirs; for I see that, just as poetry is forgotten unless it is often repeated, so instruction, when no longer heeded, fades from the mind. To forget good counsel is to forget the experiences that prompted the soul to desire prudence: and when those are forgotten, it is not surprising that prudence itself is forgotten.

I see also that men who take to drink or get involved in love intrigues lose the power of caring about right conduct and avoiding evil. For many who are careful with their money no sooner fall in love than they begin to waste it: and when they have spent it all, they no longer shrink from making more by methods which they formerly avoided because they thought them disgraceful.

How then can it be impossible for one who was prudent to lose his prudence, for one who was capable of just action to become incapable? To me indeed it seems that whatever is honourable, whatever is good in conduct is the result of training, and that this is especially true of prudence. For in the same body along with the soul are planted the pleasures which call to her: "Abandon prudence, and make haste to gratify us and the body."

Thus in the matter of carnal appetite, he held that those whose passions were not under complete control should limit themselves to such indulgence as the soul would reject unless the need of the body were pressing, and such as would do no harm when the need was there. As for his own conduct in this matter, it was evident that he had trained himself to avoid the fairest and most attractive more easily than others avoid the ugliest and most repulsive.

Concerning eating and drinking then and carnal indulgence such were his views, and he thought that a due portion of pleasure would be no more lacking to him than to those who give themselves much to these, and that much less trouble would fall to his lot.

“Should not every man hold self-control to be the foundation of all virtue, and first lay this foundation firmly in his soul? For who without this can learn any good or practise it worthily? Or what man that is the slave of his pleasures is not in an evil plight body and soul alike? From my heart I declare that every free man should pray not to have such a man among his slaves; and every man who is a slave to such pleasures should entreat the gods to give him good masters: thus, and only thus, may he find salvation.”

Such were his words; but his own self-control was shown yet more clearly by his deeds than by his words. For he kept in subjection not only the pleasures of the body, but those too that money brings, in the belief that he who takes money from any casual giver puts himself under a master and endures the basest form of slavery.

“Do you not know that by training, a puny weakling comes to be better at any form of exercise he practises, and gets more staying power, than the muscular prodigy who neglects to train? Seeing then that I am always training my body to answer any and every call on its powers, do you not think that I can stand every strain better than you can without training? For avoiding slavery to the belly or to sleep and incontinence, is there, think you, any more effective specific than the possession of other and greater pleasures, which are delightful not only to enjoy, but also because they arouse hopes of lasting benefit? And again, you surely know that while he who supposes that nothing goes well with him is unhappy, he who believes that he is successful in farming or a shipping concern or any other business he is engaged in is happy in the thought of his prosperity. Do you think then that out of all this thinking there comes anything so pleasant as the thought: 'I am growing in goodness and am making better friends?' And that, I may say, is my constant thought.

"Further, if help is wanted by friends or city, which of the two has more leisure to supply their needs, he who lives as I am living or he whose life you call happy? Which will find soldiering the easier task, he who cannot exist without expensive food or he who is content with what he can get? Which when besieged will surrender first, he who wants what is very hard to come by or he who can make shift with whatever is at hand?

"You seem…to imagine that happiness consists in luxury and extravagance. But my belief is that to have no wants is divine; to have as few as possible comes next to the divine; and as that which is divine is supreme, so that which approaches nearest to its nature is nearest to the supreme."

“…it is common opinion among us in regard to beauty and wisdom that there is an honourable and a shameful way of bestowing them. For to offer one's beauty for money to all comers is called prostitution; but we think it virtuous to become friendly with a lover who is known to be a man of honour. So is it with wisdom. Those who offer it to all comers for money are known as sophists, prostitutors of wisdom, but we think that he who makes a friend of one whom he knows to be gifted by nature, and teaches him all the good he can, fulfils the duty of a citizen and a gentleman. That is my own view, Antiphon. Others have a fancy for a good horse or dog or bird: my fancy, stronger even than theirs, is for good friends. And I teach them all the good I can, and recommend them to others from whom I think they will get some moral benefit. And the treasures that the wise men of old have left us in their writings I open and explore with my friends. If we come on any good thing, we extract it, and we set much store on being useful to one another.”

For my part, when I heard these words fall from his lips, judged him to be a happy man himself and to be putting his hearers in the way of being gentlemen.

On yet another occasion Antiphon asked him: "How can you suppose that you make politicians of others, when you yourself avoid politics even if you understand them?"

”How now, Antiphon?" he retorted, "should I play a more important part in politics by engaging in them alone or by taking pains to turn out as many competent politicians as possible?”

…he always said that the best road to glory is the way that makes a man as good as he wishes to be thought...he would show how unprofitable is a reputation for wealth or courage or strength when it is undeserved.

Book II

"What, Aristippus," exclaimed Socrates, "don't you think that there is just this difference between these voluntary and involuntary sufferings, that if you bear hunger or thirst willingly, you can eat, drink, or what not, when you choose, whereas compulsory suffering is not to be ended at will? Besides, he who endures willingly enjoys his work because he is comforted by hope; hunters, for instance, toil gladly in hope of game. Rewards like these are indeed of little worth after all the toil; but what of those who toil to win good friends, or to subdue enemies, or to make themselves capable in body and soul of managing their own homes well, of helping their friends and serving their country? Surely these toil gladly for such prizes and live a joyous life, well content with themselves, praised and envied by everyone else? Moreover, indolence and present enjoyment can never bring the body into good condition, as trainers say, neither do they put into the soul knowledge of any value, but strenuous effort leads up to good and noble deeds, as good men say.

And so says Hesiod somewhere: 'Wickedness can be had in abundance easily: smooth is the road and very nigh she dwells. But in front of virtue the gods immortal have put sweat: long and steep is the path to her and rough at first; but when you reach the top, then at length the road is easy, hard though it was.'”

“…it is better to belong to a community, secure in the possession of a sufficiency, than to dwell in solitude with a precarious hold on all the property of their fellow-citizens…”

“… if you want to be thought good at anything, you must try to be so; that is the quickest, the surest, the best way. You will find on reflection that every kind of virtue named among men is increased by study and practice.”

“…it is by no means easy to find a post in which one is not liable to censure.

Whatever one does, it is difficult to avoid mistakes, and it is difficult to escape unfair criticism even if one makes no mistakes. I wonder if you find it easy to avoid complaints entirely even from your present employers. You should try, therefore, to have no truck with grumblers and to attach yourself to considerate masters; to undertake such duties as you can perform and beware of any that are too much for you, and, whatever you do, to give of your best and put your heart into the business.

In this way, I think, you are most likely to escape censure, find relief from your difficulties, live in ease and security, and obtain an ample competence for old age.”

Marcus Tullius Cicero

On Moral Duties (De Officiis)

Marcus Tullius Cicero, 44 BC

Book 1

Now, among the many important and useful subjects in philosophy that have been discussed by philosophers with precision and fulness of statement, their traditions and precepts concerning the duties of life seem to have the widest scope. Indeed, no part of life, whether in public or in private affairs, abroad or at home, in your personal conduct or your social relations, can be free from the claims of duty; and it is in the observance of duty that lies all the honor of life, in its neglect, all the shame...For he who so interprets the supreme good as to disjoin it from virtue, and measures it by his own convenience, and not by the standard of right, — he, I say, if he be consistent with himself, and be not sometimes overcome by natural goodness, can cultivate neither friendship, nor justice, nor generosity; nor can he possibly be brave while he esteems pain as the greatest of evils, or temperate while he regards pleasure as the supreme good.

I think it fit, however, since duty is to be my sole subject, to define duty at the outset...for the rational treatment of any subject ought to take its start from definition, that readers may understand what the author is writing about.

The discussion of duty is twofold. One division relates to the supreme good in itself considered; the other, to the rules by which the conduct of life may in all its parts be brought into conformity with the supreme good. Under the first head belong such questions as these: Whether all duties are of perfect obligation; whether any one duty is greater than another; and, in general, inquiries of a similar kind. But the duties for which rules are laid down belong, indeed, to the supreme good, as means to an end; yet this is the less obvious, because they seem rather to have reference to the ordering of common life. It is of these that I am going to treat in the present work. There is also another division of duty. Duty may be said to be either contingent or perfect. We may, I think, give the name of perfect duty to the absolute right, which the Greeks term [the direct, i. e. the intrinsically right.]; while contingent duty is what they call [the fitting, i. e. that which is rendered right by circumstances]. According to their definitions, what is right in itself is perfect duty; that for the doing of which a satisfactory reason can be given is a contingent duty.

According to Panaetius, in determining what we ought to do there are three questions to be considered. It is first to be determined whether the contemplated act is right or wrong, — a matter as to which there often are opposite opinions. Then there is room for inquiry or consultation whether the act under discussion is conducive to convenience and pleasure, to affluence and free command of outward goods, to wealth, to power, in fine, to the means by which one can benefit himself and those dependent on him; and here the question turns on expediency. The third class of cases is when what appears to be expedient seems repugnant to the right. For when expediency lays, as it were, violent hands upon us, and the right seems to recall us to itself, the mind is distracted, and laden with two-fold anxiety as to the course of action. In this distribution of the subject, while a division ought by all means to be exhaustive, there are two omissions. Not only is the question of right or wrong as to an act wont to be considered, but also the question, of two right things which is the more right; equally, of two expedient things which is the more expedient. Thus we see that the division which Panaetius thought should be threefold ought to be distributed under five heads. First, then, I am to treat of the right, but under two heads; then, in the same way, of the expedient; lastly, of their seeming conflict. ____ ...convenience and pleasure, to affluence and free command of outward goods, to wealth, to power, in fine, to the means by which one can benefit himself and those dependent on him; and here the question turns on expediency. The third class of cases is when what appears to be expedient seems repugnant to the right. For when expediency lays, as it were, violent hands upon us, and the right seems to recall us to itself, the mind is distracted, and laden with two-fold anxiety as to the course of action. In this distribution of the subject, while a division ought by all means to be exhaustive, there are two omissions. Not only is the question of right or wrong as to an act wont to be considered, but also the question, of two right things which is the more right; equally, of two expedient things which is the more expedient. Thus we see that the division which Panaetius thought should be threefold ought to be distributed under five heads. First, then, I am to treat of the right, but under two heads; then, in the same way, of the expedient; lastly, of their seeming conflict. anything lascivious. From these elements the right, which is the object of our inquiry, is composed and created; and this, even if it be not ennobled in title, yet is honorable, and even if no one praise it, we truly pronounce it in its very nature worthy of all praise.

You behold, indeed, my son Marcus, the very form and, as it were, the countenance of the right, which, were it seen by the eyes, as Plato says, would awaken the intensest love of wisdom. But whatever is right springs from one of four sources. It consists either in the perception and skilful treatment of the truth; or in maintaining good fellowship with men, giving to every one his due, and keeping faith in contracts and promises; or in the greatness and strength of a lofty and unconquered mind; or in the order and measure that constitute moderation and temperance. Although these four are connected and intertwined with one another, yet duties of certain kinds proceed from each of them; as from the division first named, including wisdom and prudence, proceed the investigation and discovery of truth, as the peculiar office of that virtue.

For in proportion as one sees clearly what is the inmost and essential truth with regard to any subject, and can demonstrate it with equal acuteness and promptness, he is wont to be regarded, and justly, as of transcendent discretion and wisdom. Therefore truth is submitted to this virtue as the material of which it treats, and with which it is conversant. The other three virtues have for their sphere the providing and preserving of those things on which the conduct of life depends, so that the fellowship and union of society may be maintained, and that superiority and greatness of mind may shine forth, not only in the increase of resources and the acquisition of objects of desire for one’s self, and for those dependent on him, but much more in a position from which one can look down on these very things. But order, and consistency, and moderation, and similar qualities have their scope in affairs that demand not merely the movement of the mind, but some outward action; for it is by bringing to the concerns of daily life a certain method and order that we shall maintain honor and propriety.

Of the four heads into which I have divided the nature and force of the right, the first, which consists in the cognizance of truth, bears the closest relation to human nature. For we are all attracted and drawn to the desire of knowledge and wisdom, in which we deem it admirable to excel, but both an evil and a shame to fail, to be mistaken, to be ignorant, to be deceived. In this quest of knowledge, both natural and right, there are two faults to be shunned, — one, the taking of unknown things for known, and giving our assent to them too hastily, which fault he who wishes to escape (and all ought so to wish) will give time and diligence to reflect on the subjects proposed for his consideration. The other fault is that some bestow too great zeal and too much labor on things obscure and difficult, and at the same time useless. These faults being shunned, whatever labor and care may be bestowed on subjects becoming a virtuous mind and worth knowing, will be justly commended...For the reputation of virtue consists wholly in active life, from which, however, there is often a respite, and frequent opportunities are afforded for returning to the pursuit of knowledge. At the same time mental activity, which never ceases, may retain us, without conscious effort, in meditation on the subjects of our study. But all thought and mental action ought to be occupied either in taking counsel as to the things that are right and that appertain to a good and happy life, or in the pursuit of wisdom and knowledge. I have thus spoken of the first source of duty.

Of the remaining three heads, the principle which constitutes the bond of human society and of a virtual community of life has the widest scope. Of this there are two divisions, — justice, in which consists the greatest lustre of virtue, and which those who possess are termed good; and in close alliance with justice, beneficence, which may also be called benignity or liberality. The first demand of justice is, that no one do harm to another, unless provoked by injury;1 the next, that one use common possessions as common, private, as belonging to their owners...Because each person thus has for his own a portion of those things which were common by nature, let each hold undisturbed what has fallen to his possession. If any one endeavors to obtain more for himself, he will violate the law of human society. But since, as it has been well said by Plato, we are not born for ourselves alone; since our country claims a part in us, our parents a part, our friends a part; and since, according to the Stoics, whatever the earth bears is created for the use of men, while men were brought into being for the sake of men, that they might do good to one another, — in this matter we ought to follow nature as a guide, to contribute our part to the common good, and by the interchange of kind offices, both in giving and receiving, alike by skill, by labor, and by the resources at our command, to strengthen the social union of men among men. But the foundation of justice is good faith, that is, steadfastness and truth in promises and agreements. Hence, though it may seem to some too far-fetched, I may venture to imitate the Stoics in their painstaking inquiry into the origin of words, and to derive faith from the fact corresponding to the promise.

Of injustice there are two kinds, — one, that of those who inflict injury; the other, that of those who do not, if they can, repel injury from those on whom it is inflicted.

Moreover, he who, moved by anger or by some disturbance of mind, makes an unjust assault on any person, is as one who lays violent hands on a casual companion; while he who does not, if he can, ward off or resist the injury offered to another, is as much in fault as if he were to desert his parents, or his friends, or his country. Indeed, those injuries which are purposely inflicted for the sake of doing harm, often proceed from fear, he who meditates harm to another apprehending that, if he refrains, he himself may suffer harm. But for the most part men are induced to injure others in order to obtain what they covet; and here avarice is the most frequent motive.

FR 15

Boethius

The Consolation of Philosophy

Trans. W. V. Cooper

So when I turned my eyes towards her and fixed my gaze upon her, I recognised my nurse, Philosophy, in whose chambers I had spent my life from earliest manhood. And I asked her, 'Wherefore have you, mistress of all virtues, come down from heaven above to visit my lonely place of banishment?'

But now,'said she, 'is the time for the physician's art, rather than for complaining.' Then fixing her eyes wholly on me, she said, 'Are you the man who was nourished upon the milk of my learning, brought up with my food until you had won your way to the power of a manly soul? Surely I had given you such weapons as would keep you safe, and your strength unconquered; if you had not thrown them away.

‘So it is no matter for your wonder if, in this sea of life, we are tossed about by storms from all sides; for to oppose evil men is the chief aim we set before ourselves. Though the band of such men is great in numbers, yet is it to be contemned: for it is guided by no leader, but is hurried along at random only by error running riot everywhere. If this band when warring against us presses too strongly upon us, our leader, Reason, gathers her forces into her citadel, while the enemy are busied in plundering useless baggage. As they seize the most worthless things, we laugh at them from above, untroubled by the whole band of mad marauders, and we are defended by that rampart to which riotous folly may not hope to attain.’

He who has calmly reconciled his life to fate, and set proud death beneath his feet, can look fortune in the face, unbending both to good and bad: his countenance unconquered he can shew...Fear naught, and hope naught: thus shall you have a weak man's rage disarmed. But whoso fears with trembling, or desires aught from them, he stands not firmly rooted, but dependent: thus has he thrown away his shield; he can be rooted up, and he links for himself the very chain whereby he may be dragged.

‘Wherefore not without cause has one of your own followers asked, "If God is, whence come evil things? If He is not, whence come good?"’

‘For the secret value of a conscience, that approves…its own action, is lessened somewhat each time that it receives the reward of fame by displaying its deeds...But you, by being planted within me, dispelled from the chamber of my soul all craving for that which perishes, and where your eyes were looking there could be no place for any such sacrilege. For you instilled into my ears, and thus into my daily thoughts, that saying of Pythagoras, "Follow after God."‘

‘But you have not been driven so far from your home; you have wandered thence yourself: or if you would rather hold that you have been driven, you have been driven by yourself rather than by any other. No other could have done so to you. For if you recall your true native country, you know that it is not under the rule of the many-headed people, as was Athens of old, but there is one Lord, one King, who rejoices in the greater number of his subjects, not in their banishment. To be guided by his reins, to bow to his justice, is the highest liberty. Know you not that sacred and ancient law of your own state by which it is enacted that no man, who would establish a dwelling-place for himself therein, may lawfully be put forth? For there is no fear that any man should merit exile, if he be kept safe therein by its protecting walls. But any man that may no longer wish to dwell there, does equally no longer deserve to be there.

Wherefore it is your looks rather than the aspect of this place which disturb me.[14] It is not the walls of your library, decked with ivory and glass, that I need, but rather the resting-place in your heart, wherein I have not stored books, but I have of old put that which gives value to books, a store of thoughts from books of mine.‘

Then said she, 'Think you that this universe is guided only at random and by mere chance? or think you there is any rule of reason constituted in it?' 'No, never would I think it could be so, nor believe that such sure motions could be made at random or by chance. I know that God, the founder of the universe, does overlook His work; nor ever may that day come which shall drive me to abandon this belief as untrue.’

‘So is it,' she said, 'and even so you cried just now, and only mourned that mankind alone has no part in this divine guardianship: you were fixed in your belief that all other things are ruled by reason. Yet, how strange! how much I wonder how it is that you can be so sick though you are set in such a health-giving state of mind! But let us look deeper into it: I cannot but think there is something lacking. Since you are not in doubt that the universe is ruled by God, tell me by what method you think that government is guided?' 'I scarcely know the meaning of your question; much less can I answer it.' 'Was I wrong,' said she, 'to think that something was lacking, that there was some opening in your armour, some way by which this distracting disease has crept into your soul? But tell me, do you remember what is the aim and end of all things? what the object to which all nature tends?' 'I have heard indeed, but grief has blunted my memory.' 'But do you not somehow know whence all things have their source?' 'Yes,' I said; 'that source is God...' ‘…let us thank the Giver of all health, that your nature has not altogether left you. We have yet the chief spark for your health's fire, for you have a true knowledge of the hand that guides the universe: you do believe that its government is not subject to random chance, but to divine reason. Therefore have no fear. From this tiny spark the fire of life shall forthwith shine upon you.’

‘Fortune is ever most friendly and alluring to those whom she strives to deceive, until she overwhelms them with grief beyond bearing, by deserting them when least expected. If you recall her nature, her ways, or her deserts, you will see that you never had in her, nor have lost with her, aught that was lovely…But no sudden change of outward affairs can ever come without some upheaval in the mind...’

'What is it, mortal man, that has cast you down into grief and mourning? You have seen something unwonted, it would seem, something strange to you. But if you think that Fortune has changed towards you, you are wrong. These are ever her ways: this is her very nature. She has with you preserved her own constancy by her very change. She was ever changeable at the time when she smiled upon you, when she was mocking you with the allurements of false good fortune. You have discovered both the different faces of the blind goddess. To the eyes of others she is veiled in part: to you she has made herself wholly known. If you find her welcome, make use of her ways, and so make no complaining. If she fills you with horror by her treachery, treat her with despite; thrust her away from you, for she tempts you to your ruin. For though she is the cause of this great trouble for you, she ought to have been the subject of calmness and peace. For no man can ever make himself sure that she will never desert him, and thus has she deserted you. Do you reckon such happiness to be prized, which is sure to pass away? Is good fortune dear to you, which is with you for a time and is not sure to stay, and which is sure to bring you unhappiness when it is gone? But seeing that it cannot be stayed at will, and that when it flees away it leaves misery behind, what is such a fleeting thing but a sign of coming misery? Nor should it ever satisfy any man to look only at that which is placed before his eyes.

Prudence takes measure of the results to come from all things. The very changeableness of good and bad makes Fortune's threats no more fearful, nor her smiles to be desired. And lastly, when you have once put your neck beneath the yoke of Fortune, you must with steadfast heart bear whatever comes to pass within her realm. But if you would dictate the law by which she whom you have freely chosen to be your mistress must stay or go, surely you will be acting without justification; and your very impatience will make more bitter a lot which you cannot change. If you set your sails before the wind, will you not move forward whither the wind drives you, not whither your will may choose to go? If you intrust your seed to the furrow, will you not weigh the rich years and the barren against each other? You have given yourself over to Fortune's rule, and you must bow yourself to your mistress's ways.

Are you trying to stay the force of her turning wheel? Ah! dull-witted mortal, if Fortune begin to stay still, she is no longer Fortune.‘

‘Boldly will I say that if these, of whose loss you complain, were ever yours, you would never have lost them at all...Is the insatiate discontent of man to bind me to a constancy which belongs not to my ways?…In any way, let not your spirit eat itself away: you are set in the sphere that is common to all, let your desire therefore be to live with your own lot of life, a subject of the kingdom of the world.’

"If Plenty with o'erflowing horn scatter her wealth abroad, abundantly, as in the storm-tossed sea the sand is cast around, or so beyond all measure as the stars shine forth upon the studded sky in cloudless nights; though she never stay her hand, yet will the race of men still weep and wail. Though God accept their prayers freely and give gold with ungrudging hand, and deck with honours those who deserve them, yet when they are gotten, these gifts seem naught. Wild greed swallows what it has sought, and still gapes wide for more. What bit or bridle will hold within its course this headlong lust, when, whetted by abundance of rich gifts, the thirst for possession burns? Never call we that man rich who is ever trembling in haste and groaning for that he thinks he lacks.”

‘Think you that there is any certainty in the affairs of mankind, when you know that often one swift hour can utterly destroy a man? For though the chances of life may seldom be depended upon, yet the last day of a lifetime seems to be the end of Fortune's power, though it perhaps would stay. What, think you, should we therefore say; that you desert her by dying, or that she deserts you by leaving you?'

‘For this is sure, and this is fixed by everlasting law, that naught which is brought to birth shall constant here abide.'

‘But,' said Philosophy, 'you are paying the penalty for your mistaken expectations, and with this you cannot justly charge your life's circumstances...Whose happiness is so firmly established that he has no quarrel from any side with his estate of life? For the condition of our welfare is a matter fraught with care: either its completeness never appears, or it never remains. One man's wealth is abundant, but his birth and breeding put him to shame. Another is famous for his noble birth, but would rather be unknown because he is hampered by his narrow means. A third is blessed with wealth and breeding, but bewails his life because he has no wife.

Another is happy in his marriage, but has no children, and saves his wealth only for an heir that is no son of his. Another is blessed with children, but weeps tears of sorrow for the misdeeds of son or daughter. So none is readily at peace with the lot his fortune sends him. For in each case there is that which is unknown to him who has not experienced it, and which brings horror to him who has experienced it. Consider further, that the feelings of the most fortunate men are the most easily affected, wherefore, unless all their desires are supplied, such men, being unused to all adversity, are cast down by every little care: so small are the troubles which can rob them of complete happiness.’

‘How many are they, think you, who would think themselves raised to heaven if the smallest part of the remnants of your good fortune fell to them? This very place, which you call a place of exile, is home to those who live herein. Thus there is nothing wretched unless you think it to be so: and in like manner he who bears all with a calm mind finds his lot wholly blessed. Who is so happy but would wish to change his estate, if he yields to impatience of his lot? With how much bitterness is the sweetness of man's life mingled! For even though its enjoyment seem pleasant, yet it may not be surely kept from departing when it will. It is plain then how wretched is the happiness of mortal life which neither endures for ever with men of calm mind, nor ever wholly delights the care-ridden. Wherefore, then, O mortal men, seek ye that happiness without, which lies within yourselves? Ye are confounded by error and ignorance…Is there aught that you value more highly than your own self? You will answer that there is nothing. If then you are master of yourself, you will be in possession of that which you will never wish to lose, and which Fortune will never be able to take from you...’

‘Nature is content with very little, and if you seek to thrust upon her more than is enough, then what you cast in will become either unpleasing or even harmful.’

‘Out of all these possessions, then, which you reckon as your wealth, not one can really be shown to be your own. For if they have no beauty for you to acquire, what have they for which you should grieve if you lose them, or in keeping which you should rejoice? And if they are beautiful by their own nature, how are you the richer thereby? For these would have been pleasing of themselves, though cut out from your possessions. They do not become valuable by reason that they have come into your wealth; but you have desired to count them among your wealth, because they seemed valuable. Why then do you long for them with such railing against Fortune? You seek, I believe, to put want to flight by means of plenty. But you find that the opposite results. The more various is the beauty of furniture, the more helps are needed to keep it beautiful; and it is ever true that they who have much, need much; and on the other hand, they need least who measure their wealth by the needs of nature, not by excess of display.’

'Is there then no good which belongs to you and is implanted within you, that you seek your good things elsewhere, in things without you and separate from you?

Have things taken such a turn that the animal, whose reason gives it a claim to divinity, cannot seem beautiful to itself except by the possession of. lifeless trappings?

Other classes of things are satisfied by their intrinsic possessions; but men, though made like God in understanding, seek to find among the lowest things adornment for their higher nature: and you do not understand that you do a great wrong thereby to your Creator. He intended that the human race should be above all other earthly beings; yet you thrust down your honourable place below the lowest. For if every good thing is allowed to be more valuable than that to which it belongs, surely you are putting yourselves lower than them in your estimation, since you think precious the most worthless of things; and this is indeed a just result. Since, then, this is the condition of human nature, that it surpasses other classes only when it realises what is in itself; as soon as it ceases to know itself, it must be reduced to a lower rank than the beasts. To other animals ignorance of themselves is natural; in men it is a fault. How plainly and how widely do you err by thinking that anything can be adorned by ornaments that belong to others! Surely that cannot be. For if anything becomes brilliant by additions thereto, the praise for the brilliance belongs to the additions. But the subject remains in its own vileness, though hidden and covered by these externals.’

‘Again, I say that naught can be a good thing which does harm to its possessor.

Am I wrong? "No," you will say. Yet many a time do riches harm their possessors, since all base men, who are therefore the most covetous, think that they themselves alone are worthy to possess all gold and precious stones. You therefore, who now go in fear of the cudgel and sword of the robber, could laugh in his face if you had entered upon this path with empty pockets.[18] How wonderful is the surpassing blessing of mortal wealth! As soon as you have acquired it, your cares begin!‘

‘…if, as rarely happens, places of honour are granted to honest men, what else is delightful in them but the honesty they practise thereby? Wherefore honour comes not to virtue from holding office, but comes to office from virtues there practised. ‘

‘How can any exercise right upon any other except upon the body alone, or that which is below the body, whereby I mean the fortunes? Can you ever impose any law upon a free spirit? Can you ever disturb the peculiar restfulness which is the property of a mind that hangs together upon the firm basis of its reason? When a certain tyrant thought that by tortures he would compel a free man[l9] to betray the conspirators in a plot against his life, the philosopher bit through his tongue and spat it out in the tyrant's face. Thus were the tortures, which the tyrant intended to have cruel results, turned by the philosopher into subjects of high courage.‘

‘…if there were any intrinsic good in the nature of honours and powers themselves, they could never crowd upon the basest men. For opposites will not be bound together. Nature refuses to allow contraries to be linked to each other.

Wherefore, while it is undoubted that for the most part offices of honour are enjoyed by bad men, it is also manifest that those things are not by nature good, which allow themselves to cling to evil men. And this indeed may worthily be held of all the gifts of fortune which come with the greatest success to the most unscrupulous. And in this matter we must also think on this fact, that no one doubts a man to be brave in whom he has found by examination that bravery is implanted: and whoever has the quality of swiftness is plainly swift. So also music makes men musical, medicine makes men physicians, oratory makes men orators. The nature of each quality acts as is peculiar to itself: it is not confused with the results of contrary qualities, but goes so far as to drive out those qualities which are opposed to it. Wealth cannot quench the insatiable thirst of avarice: nor can power ever make master of himself the man whom vicious passions hold fast in unbreakable chains. Honours, when joined to dishonest men, so far from making them honourable, betray them rather, and show them to be dishonourable. Why is this so? It is because you rejoice to call things by false names which belong not to them; their names are refuted by the reality of their qualities: wherefore neither riches, nor that kind of power, nor these honours, can justly so be called. Lastly, we may come to the same conclusion concerning all the aspects of Fortune: nothing is to be sought in her, and it is plain she has no innate good, for she is not always joined with good men, nor does she make good those with whom she is joined.'

‘…there is one thing which can attract minds, which, though by nature excelling, yet are not led by perfection to the furthest bounds of virtue; and that thing is the love of fame and reputation for deserving well of one's country...Wherefore, however long drawn out may be the life of your fame, it is not even small, but it is absolutely nothing when compared with eternity. You know not how to act rightly except for the breezes of popular opinion and for the sake of empty rumours; thus the excellence of conscience and of virtue is left behind, and you seek rewards from the tattle of other men...But we are speaking of great men: and I ask, what do they gain from fame, though they seek glory by virtue? what have they after the body is dissolved at death? For if men die utterly, as our reason forbids us to believe, there is no glory left to them at all, since they whose it is said to be, do not exist. If, on the other hand, the mind is still conscious and working when it is freed from its earthly prison, it seeks heaven in its freedom and surely spurns all earthly traffic: it enjoys heaven and rejoices in its release from the of this world.’

Epictetus

The Discourses of Epictetus

Of the Things that Are and Are Not in Our Power

What then is to be done? To make the best of what is in our power, and take the rest as it occurs. And how does it occur? As it pleases God…

Thraseas used to say, “I had rather be killed today, than banished to-morrow.” But how did Rufus answer him? “If you prefer it as a heavier misfortune, how foolish a preference! If as a lighter, who has put it in your power? Why do not you study to be contented with what is allotted you?”…

This it is to have studied what ought to be studied; to have placed our desires and aversions above tyranny and above chance. I must die: if instantly, I will die instantly; if in a short time, I will dine first; and when the hour comes, then I will die. How? As becomes one who restores what is not his own.

Of Progress

Show me then your progress in this point. As if I should say to a wrestler, Show me your muscle; and he should answer me, “See my dumb-bells.” Your dumb-bells are your own affair: I desire to see the effect of them.

“Take the treatise on the active powers, and see how thoroughly I have perused it.”

I do not inquire into this, O! slavish man; but how you exert those powers; how you manage your desires and aversions, how your intentions and purposes; how you meet events, whether in accordance with nature’s laws, or contrary to them. If in accordance, give me evidence of that, and I will say you improve…Never make your life to consist in one thing and yet seek progress in another.

Where is progress, then?

If any of you, withdrawing himself from externals, turns to his own will, to train, and perfect, and render it conformable to nature; noble, free, unrestrained, unhindered, faithful, humble; if he hath learnt, too, that whoever desires or shuns things beyond his own power, can neither be faithful nor free, but must necessarily take his chance with them, must necessarily too be subject to others, to such as can procure or prevent what he desires or shuns; if, rising in the morning, he observes and keeps to these rules; bathes regularly, eats frugally; and to every subject of action, applies the same fixed principles, — if a racer to racing, if an orator to oratory; this is he, who truly makes progress; this is he, who hath not labored in vain. But if he is wholly intent on reading books, and hath labored that point only, and travelled for that; I bid him go home immediately, and do his daily duties; since that which he sought is nothing.

The only real thing is, to study how to rid life of lamentation, and complaint, and Alas! and I am undone, and misfortune, and failure; and to learn what death, what exile, what a prison, what poison is; that he may be able to say in a prison, like Socrates, “My dear Crito, if it thus pleases the gods, thus let it be”; and not, “Wretched old man, have I kept my gray hairs for this!” [Do you ask] who speaks thus? Do you think I quote some mean and despicable person? Is it not Priam who says it? Is it not Œdipus? Nay, how many kings say it? For what else is tragedy, but the dramatized sufferings of men, bewildered by an admiration of externals? If one were to be taught by fictions, that things beyond our will are nothing to us, I should rejoice in such a fiction, by which I might live prosperous and serene. But what you wish for, it is your business to consider.

Of what service, then, is Chrysippus to us?

To teach you, that those things are not false, on which true prosperity and peace depend. “Take my books, and you will see, how true and conformable to nature those things are, which give me peace.” How great a happiness! And how great the benefactor, who shows the way! To Triptolemus all men have raised temples and altars, because he gave us a milder kind of food: but to him who hath discovered, and brought to light, and communicated the truth to all; the means, not of living merely, but of living well; who among you ever raised an altar or a temple, or dedicated a statue, or who worships God in his name? We offer sacrifices in memory of those who have given us corn and the vine; and shall we not give thanks to God, for those who have nurtured such fruit in the human breast; even the truth which makes us blessed?

Of Self-Evident Truths

It is said that there are those who will oppose very evident truths, and yet it is not easy to find a reason which may persuade such an one to alter his opinion. This may arise neither from his own strength, nor from the weakness of his teacher; but when a man becomes obstinate in error, reason cannot always reach him.

Now there are two sorts of obstinacy: the one, of the intellect; the other, of the will. A man may obstinately set himself not to assent to evident truths, nor to quit the defence of contradictions. We all dread a bodily paralysis; and would make use of every contrivance to avoid it: but none of us is troubled about a paralysis of the soul. And yet, indeed, even with regard to the soul, when a person is so affected as not to apprehend or understand anything, we think him in a sad condition; but where the emotions of shame and modesty are under an absolute paralysis, we go so far as even to call this strength of mind!

Of Providence

FROM every event that happens in the world it is easy to celebrate Providence, if a person hath but these two qualities in himself; a faculty of considering what happens to each individual, and a grateful temper. Without the first, he will not perceive the usefulness of things which happen; and without the other, he will not be thankful for them. If God had made colors, and had not made the faculty of seeing them, what would have been their use? None. On the other hand, if he had made the faculty of observation, without objects to observe, what would have been the use of that? None. Again; if he had formed both the faculty and the objects, but had not made light?Neither in that case would they have been of any use.

Who is it then that hath fitted each of these to the other? Who is it that hath fitted the sword to the scabbard, and the scabbard to the sword? Is there no such Being? From the very construction of a complete work, we are used to declare positively, that it must be the operation of some artificer, and not the effect of mere chance. Doth every such work, then, demonstrate an artificer; and do not visible objects, and the sense of seeing, and light, demonstrate one? Do not the difference of the sexes, and their inclination to each other, and the use of their several powers; do not these things demonstrate an artificer? Most certainly they do.

But further; this constitution of understanding, by which we are not simply impressed by sensible objects, but take and subtract and add and combine, and pass from point to point by inference; is not all this sufficient to prevail on some men, and make them ashamed of leaving an artificer out of their scheme? If not, let them explain to us what the power is that effects each of these; and how it is possible that chance should produce things so wonderful, and which carry such marks of design?…

Well then; each of the animals is constituted either for food, or husbandry, to produce milk, or for some other like use; and for these purposes what need is there of understanding things, and being able to discriminate concerning them? But God hath introduced man, as a spectator of himself and of his works; and not only as a spectator, but an interpreter of them. It is therefore shameful that man should begin and end, where irrational creatures do. He is indeed to begin there, but to end where nature itself hath fixed our end; and that is, in contemplation and understanding, and in a scheme of life conformable to nature…

But there are in life some things unpleasant and difficult…Well; and have you not received faculties by which you may support every event? Have you not received greatness of soul? Have you not received a manly spirit? Have you not received patience? What signifies to me anything that happens, while my soul is above it? What shall disconcert or trouble or appear grievous to me? Shall I not use my powers to that purpose for which I received them; but lament and groan at every casualty?

“True, no doubt; but I have such a disagreeable catarrh!” Attend to your diseases, then, as best you can. Do you say, it is unreasonable that there should be such a discomfort in the world?

And how much better is it that you should have a catarrh than complain? Pray, what figure do you think Hercules would have made, if there had not been a lion, and a hydra, and a stag, and unjust and brutal men, whom he expelled and cleared away?

And what would he have done, if none of these had existed? Is it not plain, that he must have wrapt himself up and slept? In the first place, then, he would never have become a Hercules, by slumbering away his whole life in such delicacy and ease; or if he had, what good would it have done? What would have been the use of his arm and his strength, — of his patience and greatness of mind, — if such circumstances and subjects of action had not roused and exercised him?

What then, must we provide these things for ourselves; and introduce a boar, and a lion, and a hydra, into our country?

This would be madness and folly. But as they were in being, and to be met with, they were proper subjects to call out and exercise Hercules. Do you therefore likewise, being sensible of this, consider the faculties you have; and after taking a view of them, say, “Bring on me now, O Zeus, what difficulty thou wilt, for I have faculties granted me by thee, and powers by which I may win honor from every event.” — No; but you sit trembling, for fear this or that should happen, and lamenting, and mourning, and groaning at what doth happen; and then you accuse the gods. For what is the consequence of such a baseness, but impiety? And yet God hath not only granted these faculties, by which we may bear every event, without being depressed or broken by it; but, like a good prince, and a true father, hath placed their exercise above restraint, compulsion, or hindrance, and wholly within our own control; nor hath he reserved a power, even to himself, of hindering or restraining them. Having these things free, and your own, will you not use them, nor consider what you have received, nor from whom? But you sit groaning and lamenting, some of you, blind to him who gave them, and not acknowledging your benefactor; and others basely turn themselves to complaints and accusations against God! Yet I undertake to show you, that you have means and powers to exhibit greatness of soul, and a manly spirit; but what occasion you have to find fault, and complain, do you show me if you can.

Of Right Reasoning

For what is reasoning? To lay down true positions; to reject false ones; and to suspend the judgment in doubtful ones. Is it enough, then, to have learned merely this? It is enough, say you. — Is it enough, then, for him who would not commit any mistake in the use of money, merely to have heard, that we are to receive the good pieces, and to reject the bad? — This is not enough. — What must be added besides? That skill which tries and distinguishes what pieces are good, what bad. — Therefore, in reasoning too, the definition just given is not enough; but it is necessary that we should be able to prove and distinguish between the true, and the false, and the doubtful. This is clear.

Of Our Relationship to God

This is the work, if any, that ought to employ your master and preceptor, if you had one, that you should come to him, and say: “Epictetus, we can no longer bear being tied down to this poor body; feeding, and resting, and cleaning it, and vexed with so many low cares on its account. Are not these things indifferent, and nothing to us; and death no evil? Are we not of kindred to God; and did we not come from him? Suffer us to go back thither from whence we came: suffer us at length to be delivered from these fetters that bind and weigh us down. Here thieves and robbers, courts and tyrants, claim power over us, through the body and its possessions. Suffer us to show them that they have no power.”

And in this case it would be my part to answer: “My friends, wait for God till he shall give the signal, and dismiss you from this service; then return to him. For the present, be content to remain at this post, where he has placed you. The time of your abode here is short and easy, to such as are disposed like you; for what tyrant, what robber, what thief or what court can be formidable to those who thus count for nothing the body and its possessions. Stay, nor foolishly depart.”

Thus ought the case to stand between a preceptor and ingenuous young men. But how stands it now? The preceptor has no life in him; and you have none. When you have had enough to-day, you sit weeping about to-morrow, how you shall get food. Why, if you have it, slave, you will have it; if not, you will go out of life. The door is open; why do you lament; what room remains for tears; what occasion for flattery? Why should any one person envy another? Why should he be impressed with awe by those who have great possessions, or are placed in high rank? especially, if they are powerful and passionate? For what will they do to us? The things which they can do, we do not regard: the things about which we are concerned, they cannot reach. Who then, after all, shall hold sway over a person thus disposed? How behaved Socrates in regard to these things? As it became one conscious of kinship with the gods. He said to his judges: — “If you should tell me, ‘We will acquit you, upon condition that you shall no longer discourse in the manner you have hitherto done, nor make any disturbance either among our young or our old people’; I would answer: ‘You are ridiculous in thinking, that if your general had placed me in any post, I ought to maintain and defend it, and choose to die a thousand times, rather than desert it; but that if God hath assigned me any station or method of life, I ought to desert that for you.’”

This it is, for a man to truly recognize his relationship with God. But we habitually think of ourselves as mere stomach and intestines and bodily parts. Because we fear, because we desire, we flatter those who can help us in these matters; we dread them too.

Of Contentment

Concerning the gods, some affirm, that there is no deity; others, that he indeed exists, but is slothful, negligent, and without providential care; a third class admits both his being and his providence, but only in respect to great and heavenly objects, not earthly; a fourth recognizes him both in heaven and earth, but only in general, not individual matters; a fifth, like Ulysses and Socrates, says, “I cannot be hid from thee in any of my motions.”

It is, before all things, necessary to examine each of these opinions; which is, and which is not rightly spoken. Now, if there are no gods, wherefore serve them? If there are, but they take no care of anything, how is the case bettered? Or, if they both are, and take care; yet, if there is nothing communicated from them to men, and therefore certainly nothing to me, how much better is it? A wise and good man, after examining these things, submits his mind to Him who administers the whole, as good citizens do to the laws of the commonwealth.

He, then, who comes to be instructed, ought to come with this aim: “How may I in everything follow the gods? How may I acquiesce in the divine administration? And how may I be free?” For he is free, to whom all happens agreeably to his desire, and whom no one can unduly restrain.

“What then, is freedom mere license?” By no means; for madness and freedom are incompatible. “But I would have that happen which appears to me desirable; however it comes to appear so.”

You are mad: you have lost your senses. Do not you know, that freedom is a very beautiful and valuable thing? But for me to choose at random, and for things to happen agreeably to such a choice, may be so far from a beautiful thing, as to be, of all others, the most undesirable. For how do we proceed in writing? Do I choose to write the name of Dion (for instance) as I will? No; but I am taught to be willing to write it as it ought to be written. And what is the case in music? The same. And what in every other art or science? Otherwise, it would be of no purpose to learn anything, if it were to be adapted to each one’s particular humor. Is it then only in the greatest and principal matter, that of freedom, permitted me to desire at random? By no means; but true instruction is this, — learning to desire that things should happen as they do. And how do they happen? As the appointer of them hath appointed. He hath appointed, that there should be summer and winter, plenty and dearth, virtue and vice, and all such contrarieties, for the harmony of the whole. To each of us he has given a body and its parts, and our several possessions and companions. Mindful of this appointment, we should enter upon a course of education and instruction, not in order to change the constitution of things; — a gift neither practicable nor desirable; — but that things being as they are with regard to us, we may have our mind accommodated to the facts. Can we, for instance, flee from mankind? How is that possible? Can we, by conversing with them, transform them? Who has given us such a power? What then remains, or what method is there to be found, for such a commerce with them, that, while they act according to the appearances in their own minds, we may nevertheless be affected conformably to nature?

Of Divine Supervision

To this God you likewise ought to swear such an oath as the soldiers do to Cæsar. For they, in order to receive their pay, swear to prefer before all things the safety of Cæsar; and will not you swear, who have received so many and so great favors; or, if you have sworn, will you not fulfil the oath? And what must you swear? Never to distrust, nor accuse, nor murmur at any of the things appointed by him; nor to shrink from doing or enduring that which is inevitable. Is this oath like the former? In the first oath persons swear never to dishonor Cæsar; by the last, never to dishonor themselves.

What Philosophy Promises

WHEN one consulted him, how he might persuade his brother to forbear treating him ill; — Philosophy, answered Epictetus, doth not promise to procure any outward good for man; otherwise it would admit something beyond its proper theme. For as the material of a carpenter is wood; of a statuary, brass; so of the art of living, the material is each man’s own life.

“What, then, is my brother’s life?”

That, again, is matter for his own art, but is external to you; like property, health, or reputation. Philosophy promises none of these. In every circumstance I will keep my will in harmony with nature. To whom belongs that will? To Him in whom I exist.

“But how, then, is my brother’s unkindness to be cured?”

Bring him to me, and I will tell him; but I have nothing to say to you about his unkindness.

But the inquirer still further asking for a rule for self-government, if he should not be reconciled; Epictetus answered thus: — No great thing is created suddenly; any more than a bunch of grapes or a fig. If you tell me, that you desire a fig, I answer you, that there must be time. Let it first blossom, then bear fruit, then ripen. Since then, the fruit of a fig-tree is not brought to perfection suddenly, or in one hour; do you think to possess instantaneously and easily the fruit of the human mind? I warn you, expect it not.

Of Providence

Does not nature in each of us call out, even at a distance, I am a man; approach and address me as such; inquire no further; see the characteristic. On the other hand, with regard to women, as she has mixed something softer in their voice, so she has deprived them of a beard. But no; [some think] this living being should have been left undistinguished, and each of us should be obliged to proclaim, “I am a man!” But why is not this characteristic beautiful and becoming, and venerable? How much more beautiful than the comb of cocks; how much more noble than the mane of lions! Therefore, we ought to preserve the characteristics, made by the Creator; we ought not to reject them, nor confound, as much as in us lies, the distinct sexes.

Are these the only works of Providence, with regard to us? And what speech can fitly celebrate their praise? For, if we had any understanding, ought we not, both in public and in private, incessantly to sing and praise the Deity, and rehearse his benefits? Ought we not, whether we dig, or plough, or eat, to sing this hymn to God? Great is God, who has supplied us with these instruments to till the ground; great is God, who has given us hands and organs of digestion; who has given us to grow insensibly, to breathe in sleep. These things we ought forever to celebrate; but to make it the theme of the greatest and divinest hymn, that he has given us the power to appreciate these gifts, and to use them well. But because the most of you are blind and insensible, there must be some one to fill this station, and lead in behalf of all men, the hymn to God; for what else can I do, a lame old man, but sing hymns to God? Were I a nightingale, I would act the part of a nightingale; were I a swan, the part of a swan. But since I am a reasonable creature, it is my duty to praise God. This is my business. I do it. Nor will I ever desert this post, so long as it is permitted me; and I call on you to join in the same song.

Of the Necessity of Reason

Since it is Reason which shapes and regulates all other things, it ought not itself to be left in disorder. But by what shall it be regulated? Evidently, either by itself, or by something else. Well; either that too is Reason, or something else superior to Reason, which is impossible; and, if it be Reason, what again shall regulate that? For, if this Reason can regulate itself, so can the former; and, if we still require any further agent, the series will be infinite, and without end…

But what, then, is the admirable thing?

To understand the will of nature.

Well then; do you conform to it yourself? In that case, what need have you for any one else? For, if it be true, that men err but unwillingly, and if you have learnt the truth, you must needs act rightly…

You have a free will, O man! incapable of being restrained or compelled... I will show you this, first, in the faculty of assent. Can any one restrain you from assenting to truth? No one. Can any one compel you to admit a falsehood? No one. You see, then, that you have here a free will, incapable of being restrained, or compelled, or hindered. Well; is it otherwise with regard to pursuit and desire? What can displace one pursuit? Another pursuit. What, desire and aversion? Another desire and another aversion. “If you offer death as an alternative,” say you, you compel me. No; not the alternative does it, but your conviction that it is better to do such a thing than to die. Here, again, you see that it is your own conviction which compels you; that is, choice compels choice. For, if God had constituted that portion which he has separated from his own essence, and given to us, capable of being restrained or compelled, either by himself, or by any other, he would not have been God, nor have fitly cared for us.

THAT WE OUGHT NOT TO BE ANGRY WITH THE ERRING

Why are we thus enraged? Because we make idols of those things which such people take from us. Make not an idol of your clothes, and you will not be enraged with the thief. Make not an idol of a woman’s beauty, and you will not be enraged with an adulterer. Know, that thief and adulterer cannot reach the things that are properly your own; but those only which belong to others, and are not within your power. If you can give up these things, and look upon them as not essential, with whom will you any longer be enraged? But while you idolize them, be angry with yourself, rather than with others.

But the tyrant will chain — what? A leg. He will take away — what? A head. What is there, then, that he can neither chain nor take away? The free will. Hence the advice of the ancients, — Know thyself.

“What then ought we to do?”

Practise yourself, for heaven’s sake, in little things; and thence proceed to greater. “I have a pain in my head.” Do not lament. “I have a pain in my ear.” Do not lament. I do not say you may never groan; but do not groan in spirit; or, if your servant be a long while in bringing you something to bind your head, do not croak and go into hysterics, and say, “Everybody hates me.” For, who would not hate such a one?

Relying for the future on these principles, walk erect and free; not trusting to bulk of body, like a wrestler; for one should not be unconquerable in the sense that an ass is.

Who then is unconquerable? He whom the inevitable cannot overcome. For such a person I imagine every trial, and watch him as an athlete in each. He has been victorious in the first encounter. What will he do in the second? What, if he should be exhausted by the heat? What, if the field be Olympia? And so in other trials. If you throw money in his way, he will despise it. Is he proof against the seductions of women? What if he be tested by fame, by calumny, by praise, by death? He is able to overcome them all. — If he can bear sunshine and storm, discouragement and fatigue, I pronounce him an athlete unconquered indeed.

50

The Enchiridion

Epictetus, Trans. Thomas Wentworth Higginson

I.

THERE are things which are within our power, and there are things which are beyond our power. Within our power are opinion, aim, desire, aversion, and, in one word, whatever affairs are our own. Beyond our power are body, property, reputation, office, and, in one word, whatever are not properly our own affairs.

Now the things within our power are by nature free, unrestricted, unhindered; but those beyond our power are weak, dependent, restricted, alien. Remember then, that, if you attribute freedom to things by nature dependent, and take what belongs to others for your own; you will be hindered, you will lament, you will be disturbed, you will find fault both with Gods and men. But if you take for your own only that which is your own, and view what belongs to others just as it really is, then no one will ever compel you, no one will restrict you, you will find fault with no one, you will accuse no one, you will do nothing against your will; no one will hurt you, you will not have an enemy, nor will you suffer any harm.

Aiming therefore at such great things, remember that you must not allow yourself any inclination, however slight, towards the attainment of the others; but that you must entirely quit some of them, and for the present postpone the rest. But if you would have these, and possess power and wealth likewise, you may miss the latter in seeking the former; and you will certainly fail of that, by which alone happiness and freedom are procured.

Seek at once, therefore, to be able to say to every unpleasing semblance, “You are but a semblance and by no means the real thing.” And then examine it by those rules which you have; and first and chiefly, by this: whether it concerns the things which are within our own power, or those which are not; and if it concerns anything beyond our power, be prepared to say that it is nothing to you.

II.

Remember that desire demands the attainment of that of which you are desirous; and aversion demands the avoidance of that to which you are averse; that he who fails of the object of his desires, is disappointed; and he who incurs the object of his aversion, is wretched. If, then, you shun only those undesirable things which you can control, you will never incur anything which you shun. But if you shun sickness, or death, or poverty, you will run the risk of wretchedness. Remove aversion, then, from all things that are not within our power, and transfer it to things undesirable, which are within our power. But for the present altogether restrain desire; for if you desire any of the things not within our own power, you must necessarily be disappointed; and you are not yet secure of those which are within our power, and so are legitimate objects of desire. Where it is practically necessary for you to pursue or avoid anything, do even this with discretion, and gentleness, and moderation.

III.

With regard to whatever objects either delight the mind, or contribute to use, or are tenderly beloved, remind yourself of what nature they are, beginning with the merest trifles: if you have a favorite cup, that it is a cup of which you are fond; for thus, if it is broken, you can bear it: if you embrace your child, or your wife, that you embrace a mortal; and thus, if either of them dies, you can bear it.

IV.

When you set about any action, remind yourself of what nature the action is. If you are going to bathe, represent to yourself the incidents usual in the bath; some persons pouring out, others pushing in, others scolding, others pilfering. And thus you will more safely go about this action, if you say to yourself, “I will now go to bathe, and keep my own will in harmony with nature.” And so with regard to every other action.

For thus, if any impediment arises in bathing, you will be able to say, “It was not only to bathe that I desired, but to keep my will in harmony with nature; and I shall not keep it thus, if I am out of humor at things that happen.”

V.

Men are disturbed not by things, but by the views which they take of things. Thus death is nothing terrible, else it would have appeared so to Socrates. But the terror consists in our notion of death, that it is terrible. When, therefore, we are hindered, or disturbed, or grieved, let us never impute it to others, but to ourselves; that is, to our own views. It is the action of an uninstructed person to reproach others for his own misfortunes; of one entering upon instruction, to reproach himself; and of one perfectly instructed, to reproach neither others nor himself.

VII.

Demand not that events should happen as you wish; but wish them to happen as they do happen, and you will go on well.

IX.

Sickness is an impediment to the body, but not to the will, unless itself pleases.

Lameness is an impediment to the leg, but not to the will; and say this to yourself with regard to everything that happens. For you will find it to be an impediment to something else, but not truly to yourself.

X.

Upon every accident, remember to turn towards yourself and inquire what faculty you have for its use. If you encounter a handsome person, you will find continence the faculty needed; if pain, then fortitude; if reviling, then patience. And when thus habituated, the phenomena of existence will not overwhelm you.

XI.

Never say of anything, “I have lost it”; but, “I have restored it.” Has your child died? It is restored. Has your wife died? She is restored. Has your estate been taken away? That likewise is restored. “But it was a bad man who took it.” What is it to you, by whose hands He who gave it hath demanded it again? While He permits you to possess it, hold it as something not your own; as do travellers at an inn.

XIII.

If you would improve, be content to be thought foolish and dull with regard to externals. Do not desire to be thought to know anything; and though you should appear to others to be somebody, distrust yourself. For be assured, it is not easy at once to keep your will in harmony with nature, and to secure externals; but while you are absorbed in the one, you must of necessity neglect the other.

XIV.

If you wish your children, and your wife, and your friends, to live forever, you are foolish; for you wish things to be in your power which are not so; and what belongs to others, to be your own. So likewise, if you wish your servant to be without fault, you are foolish; for you wish vice not to be vice, but something else. But if you wish not to be disappointed in your desires, that is in your own power. Exercise, therefore, what is in your power. A man’s master is he who is able to confer or remove whatever that man seeks or shuns. Whoever then would be free, let him wish nothing, let him decline nothing, which depends on others; else he must necessarily be a slave.

XV.

Remember that you must behave as at a banquet. Is anything brought round to you?

Put out your hand, and take a moderate share. Does it pass by you? Do not stop it. Is it not yet come? Do not yearn in desire towards it, but wait till it reaches you. So with regard to children, wife, office, riches; and you will some time or other be worthy to feast with the Gods. And if you do not so much as take the things which are set before you, but are able even to forego them, then you will not only be worthy to feast with the Gods, but to rule with them also. For, by thus doing, Diogenes and Heraclitus, and others like them, deservedly became divine, and were so recognized.

XVI.

When you see any one weeping for grief, either that his son has gone abroad, or that he has suffered in his affairs; take care not to be overcome by the apparent evil. But discriminate, and be ready to say, “What hurts this man is not this occurrence itself, for another man might not be hurt by it; — but the view he chooses to take of it.” As far as conversation goes, however, do not disdain to accommodate yourself to him, and if need be, to groan with him. Take heed, however, not to groan inwardly too.

Modern Moral Philosophy

Richard Allestree

The Art of Contentment

[Richard Allestree, attr.; “Author of The Whole Duty of Man.”] At the Theater in Oxford, MDCLXXV (1675). Locators: Pref. To the Reader + page of this scan.

Pref. To the Reader (pp. 7–8)

The desire of happiness is so coessential with our nature, so interwoven and incorporate with it; that nothing but the dissolution of the whole frame can extinguish it. This runs through the whole race of mankind, and amidst the infinite variety of other inclinations, preserves itself entire. The most various contradictory tempers do yet conspire in this, and men of the most unequal fortunes, are yet equal in their wishes of being happy.

But this concurrence as to the end is not more universal than the disagreement about the way. Every man would have happiness, but wherein that consists, or how it is to be attained, has been very diversely opinioned. Indeed the ultimate supreme happiness as it is originally inherent in God, so it is wrapped up in those clouds and darkness, which, as the Psalmist says, are round about him, Psal. 18:11. And we can see nothing of it, but in those gleams and rays he is pleased to dart out upon us; so that all our estimates as to our final felicity, must be measured by those revelations he has made of it.

But one would think our temporal happiness were as much a mystery as our eternal, to see what variety of blind pursuits are made after it. One man thinks tis seated on the top pinnacle of honor, and climbs till perhaps he falls head-long. Another thinks it a mineral, that must be digged out of the earth, and toils to lade himself with thick clay, Hab. 2:6, and at last finds a grave, where he sought his treasure. A third supposes it consists in the variety of pleasures, and wearies himself in that pursuit, which only cloys, and disappoints. Yet every one of these can read you lectures of the gross mistake and folly of the other, whilst himself is equally deluded.

Thus do men chase an imaginary good, till they meet with real evils.

But God's proposals are more sincere: he knows how sandy, how false a foundation all these external things must make, and therefore warns us not to build so much as our present satisfaction upon them, but shows us a more certain, a more compendious way to acquire what we gasp after, by telling us that as Godliness in respect of the next, so contentment for this world is great gain, 1 Tim. 6:6. It is indeed the unum necessarium, the one point in which all the lines of worldly happiness are concentered, and to complete its excellence, tis to be had at home: nay indeed only there. We need not ramble in wild pursuits after it, we may form it within our own breasts: no man wants materials for it, that knows but how to put them together.

Joseph Butler

Human Nature and Other Sermons

Joseph Butler

It cannot, indeed, possibly be denied, that our being God’s creatures, and virtue being the natural law we are born under, and the whole constitution of man being plainly adapted to it, are...obligations to piety and virtue…

…to aim at public and private good are so far from being inconsistent that they mutually promote each other…

…there are as real and the same kind of indications in human nature, that we were made for society and to do good to our fellow-creatures, as that we were intended to take care of our own life and health and private good…

…there is a natural principle of benevolence in man, which is in some degree to society what self-love is to the individual. And if there be in mankind any disposition to friendship; if there be any such thing as compassion—for compassion is momentary love—if there be any such thing as the paternal or filial affections; if there be any affection in human nature, the object and end of which is the good of another, this is itself benevolence, or the love of another. Be it ever so short, be it in ever so low a degree, or ever so unhappily confined, it proves the assertion, and points out what we were designed for, as really as though it were in a higher degree and more extensive. I must, however, remind you that though benevolence and self-love are different, though the former tends most directly to public good, and the latter to private, yet they are so perfectly coincident that the greatest satisfactions to ourselves depend upon our having benevolence in a due degree; and that self-love is one chief security of our right behaviour towards society. It may be added that their mutual coinciding, so that we can scarce promote one without the other, is equally a proof that we were made for both…

…as persons without any conviction from reason of the desirableness of life would yet of course preserve it merely from the appetite of hunger, so, by acting merely from regard (suppose) to reputation, without any consideration of the good of others, men often contribute to public good. In both these instances they are plainly instruments in the hands of another, in the hands of Providence, to carry on ends—the preservation of the individual and good of society—which they themselves have not in their view or intention…instances of our Maker’s care and love both of the individual and the species, and proofs that He intended we should be instruments of good to each other, as well as that we should be so to ourselves.

John Witherspoon

Lectures on Moral Philosophy

John Witherspoon — Lectures on Moral Philosophy, ed. Varnum Lansing Collins (Princeton University Press, 1912)

Lecture VI (Collins 1912, p. 36)

As to the first we must begin with what is usually called the states of man, or several lights or relations in which he may be considered, as laying a foundation for duty. These states may be divided into two kinds—(1.) Natural. (2.) Adventitious.

The natural states may be enumerated thus: (1.) His state with regard to God, or natural relation to him. (2.)To his fellow-creatures. (3.) Solitude or society. (4.) Peace or war. Perhaps we may add to these (5.) His outward provision, plenty or want.

These are called natural states, because they are necessary and universal. All men and at all times are related to God. They were made by him, and live by his providence. We must also necessarily know our fellow-creatures, and their state to be similar to ours in this respect and many others. A man must at all times be independent or connected with society—at peace with others, or at war—well provided, or in want.

Lecture VII (Collins 1912, p. 45)

Having considered the being and perfections of God, we proceed to our duty to him.

This may be considered in two views, as general and special. 1. By the first I understand our duty to obey him and submit to him in all things. This you see includes every branch of moral duty to our neighbor and ourselves, as well as to God, and so the particular parts of it will be considered afterwards.

Lecture VII (Collins 1912, pp. 47–49)

2. Our duty to God may be considered more specially, as it points out the duties we owe immediately to himself.

These may be divided into internal and external.—1st. The internal are all included under the three following, love, fear, and trust.

The love of God, which is the first and great duty both of natural and revealed religion, may be explained in a larger and more popular, or in a more precise and stricter way.

In the first, love may be resolved into the four following acts, (1) esteem, (2) gratitude, (3) Benevolence, (4) desire.

These four will be found inseparable from true love; and it is pretty much in the same order, that the acts succeed one another. Love is founded on esteem, on the real or supposed good qualities of the object. You can no more love that which you despise than that which you hate. Gratitude is also inseparable from it, to have a lively sense of favors received, and to esteem them for the sake of the person from whom they came. Benevolence or rejoicing in the happiness and wishing well to the object. And lastly, a desire of a place in his esteem. Whatever we love, we desire to possess, as far as it is suited to our faculties.

The stricter, and more precise method of considering the love of God, is to divide it into two branches, benevolence and desire. And indeed our affections to God seem to be capable of the same division as our affection to our fellow-creatures, benevolent and selfish. I think it undeniable, that there is a disinterested love of God, which terminates directly upon himself, without any immediate view to our own happiness—as well as a discovery of our great interest in his favor.

The second great duty to God, is fear; but here we must carefully distinguish this affection from one which bears the name, and is different from it—at least in a moral view it is altogether opposite.—Dutiful fear is what may be otherwise called veneration, and hath for its object the infinity of the divine perfection in general, but particularly his majesty and greatness. The other is merely a fear of evil or punishment from him: these are called sometimes a filial and a servile fear. The first increases, as men improve in moral excellence, and the last decreases. The first is essential to true piety, the last is not, and is found often to be strongest in the most wicked and profligate, as such are often the most cowardly and the most subject to the terrors of a guilty conscience.

The third great duty is trust. This is a continual dependance on God for every thing we need, together with and approbation of, and absolute resignation to his providence.

Lecture IX (Collins 1912, pp. 58–59)

3. The third class of moral duties is what contains our duty to ourselves.

This branch of duty is as real and as much founded in the moral principle, as any of the former—Conscience as clearly testifies the evil of neglecting it—and vicious conduct in this respect does generally lead us directly not only to misery, but to shame.

We may, I think, divide our duties to ourselves into two heads. (1.) Self-government. (2.) Self-interest.

1. Self-government. By this I understand a proper regulation of all our desires and affections, and keeping them within due bounds. This duty will be better understood by considering what are the particular vices that are opposite to it, and contrary to it.

(1.) When our thoughts or desires are such as to be contrary to the love, fear, or trust we owe to God, then they are to be restrained and brought into subjection—Thus are generated the virtues of humility, contentment, patience, and such as are allied to them.

Christian Magnanimity

John Witherspoon, 1775, 1787

It is...a duty we owe to others in general, but in a special manner the elder to the younger, to give them faithful warning of the temptations and dangers to which they must of necessity be exposed if they mean to walk in the paths of piety and virtue...

[E]very real excellence is consistent with every other, nay every real excellence is adorned and illustrated by every other. Vices may be inconsistent with each other, but virtues never can. And, therefore, as magnanimity is an amiable and noble quality-one of the greatest ornaments of our nature, so I affirm that it belongs only to true and undefiled religion and that every appearance of the one without the other is not only defective but false...

It is evidently more necessary in the present state of human nature to restrain pride than to kindle ambition. But as the scripture points out our original dignity and the true glory of our nature, so every true penitent is there taught to aspire after the noblest character and to entertain the most exalted hopes...

My single purpose from these words at this time is to explain and recommend magnanimity as a christian virtue, and I wish to do it in such a manner as neither to weaken its lustre nor admit any degree of that corrupt mixture by which it is often counterfeited and greatly debased. Some infidels have in terms affirmed that Christianity has banished magnanimity and by its precepts of meekness, humility, and passive submission to injury has destroyed that nobleness of sentiment which rendered the ancients so illustrious and gives so much majesty and dignity to the histories of Greece and Rome. In opposition to this, I hope to be able to show that real greatness is inseparable from sincere piety and that any defect in the one must necessarily be a discernible blemish in the other. With this view, I will first give you the principles of magnanimity in general as a natural quality; secondly, I will show what is necessary to give it real value as a moral virtue; thirdly, show that it shines with the most perfect brightness as a Christian grace; and afterwards improve the subject by a practical application of what may be said for your instruction and direction.

First, then, let me state the principles of magnanimity in general as a natural quality. I think it must be admitted that as there is a real difference between bodies as to size and bulk, as well as other sensible qualities, so there is a real character of greatness or meanness applicable to the mind distinct from its other qualities or powers. It is, however, I apprehend a simple impression which cannot be explained or further analyzed, but may easily be felt, and is best illustrated by its effects. These may be summed up in the following particulars: To magnanimity it belongeth to attempt, (1) great and difficult things; (2) to aspire after great and valuable possessions; (3) to encounter dangers with resolution; (4) to struggle against difficulties with perseverance; and (5) to bear sufferings with fortitude and patience. 1. It belongs to magnanimity to attempt great and difficult things. Those who from a love of sloth and ease neglect the exercise or improvement of their powers and those who apply them with ever so great assiduity and attention to things mean or of small consequence are plainly destitute of this quality. We perceive a meanness and want of spirit in this respect when particular persons fall below their rank in life, or when, as is too frequently the case in any rank, they fall below human nature itself. When a prince or other person of the first order and importance in human life busies himself in nothing but the most trifling amusements or arts of little value, we call it mean; and when any man endowed with rational powers loses them through neglect or destroys them by the most groveling sensuality, we say he is acting below himself. The contrary of this, therefore, or the vigorous exertion of all our powers, and particularly the application of them to things of moment and difficulty, is real magnanimity. 2. It belongs to magnanimity to aspire after great and valuable possessions. It is more difficult properly to illustrate this as a branch of magnanimity because of its frequent perversion, which will be afterwards explained. It seems however to be necessarily included in the general character. A great mind has great capacities of enjoyment as well as action. And as there is a difference between the blessing in our view, both in point of dignity and extent, such a man will not be easily satisfied or put up with what is either mean or scanty while he can acquire and possess a better and more extensive portion. The large and increasing desires of the human mind have often been made an argument for the dignity of our nature, and our having been made for something that is great and excellent.

Francis Wayland

The Elements of Moral Science

Francis Wayland

Moral Philosophy takes it for granted that there is in human actions a moral quality; that is, that a human action may be either right or wrong…in general, Moral Philosophy proceeds upon the supposition that there exists in the actions of men a moral quality, and that there are certain sequences connected by our Creator with the exhibition of that quality.

A moral law is, therefore, a form of expression denoting an order of sequence established between the moral quality of actions, and their results.

Moral Philosophy, or Ethics, is the science which classifies and illustrates moral law.

Here it may be worth while to remark, that an order of sequence established, supposes, of necessity, an Establisher. Hence Moral Philosophy, as well as every other science, proceeds upon the supposition of the existence of a universal cause, the Creator of all things, who has made every thing as it is, and who has subjected all things to the relations which they sustain. And hence, as all relations, whether moral or physical, are the result of His enactment, an order of sequence once discovered in morals, is iust as invariable as an order of sequence in physics.

Such being the fact, it is evident, that the moral laws of God can never be varied by the institutions of man, any more than the physical laws. The results which God has connected with actions, will inevitably occur, all the created power in the universe to the contrary notwithstanding. Nor can these consequences be eluded or averted, any more than the sequences which follow by the laws of gravitation…

It is also to be remembered, that, in morals as well as in physics, the harvest is always more abundant than the seed from which it springs.

James McCosh

Our Moral Nature

James McCosh, 1892

Aim of the treatise

In my earlier volumes I have fully exposed the nature of our Intellect, of our Feelings, and of our Will. But no one of these, nor can the whole, give to man his morality and his moral ideas...

Moral Obligation

We are all familiar with Moral Obligation in this our crowded world. There are acts which are obligatory physically, such as partaking of food and taking exercise, in order to preserve our health. These acts we are required to attend to by the necessities of our nature.

There are other acts which are felt to be obligatory, but which we are not required to do by any external force: to keep our promise, to pay our debts, to hold by our contracts. There may be no external power constraining such acts. We are prompted to them by internal motives which show that there is will in them; we feel that we ought to perform them. A burden is laid upon us which we are not at liberty to decline. We feel reproach when we contravene the act, or when we neglect it.

Now this second class of obligatory acts we call moral, and the violation we call immoral. It is our business in this little work to inquire into their nature and expose them to view. To use a common statement, ethics has to do not with what is, but what ought to be...

Conscience

It is to the Conscience we owe the Obligation. We first feel the obligation, and then refer it to our moral nature, and specially to the conscience...We must look upon it as implying that certain acts are obligatory.

But specially I am to look upon it as cognitive. It discerns the good and the evil; it accepts the one and it rejects the other.

Some speak and write as if the conscience were an arbitrary, or at best merely a positive power enjoined by Him who planted it in our constitution. But conscience is a cognitive power; it discerns the good and the evil in the act, say benevolence or malevolence, just as the eye perceives color, say red or blue, in that flower, or as the muscular senses feel resistance in that stone which we hold in the hand. The good and the bad are in the acts, and are perceived by what has been expressively called the Moral Sense.

It is to be carefully noticed that it is not the decision of conscience that makes an action good or bad. It is good or evíl in itself, and its character is discovered by the moral power which approves or disapproves accordingly. It perceives benevolence to be good, it perceives cruelty to be bad; and perceives both to be so in their very nature, just as we perceive lead to be heavy and feathers to be light.

The conscience, whenever it acts, does so with authority, making man a moral agent. Though the conscience was not separated from other powers, or named till a hundred years or so before Christ, yet all along the soul undivided is spoken of as condemning the evil and approving the good.

There has been much discussion as to whether the conscience can be perverted, or whether it can be corrupted. It seems to some that conscience is a divine power planted in the mind by God, at once perfect, and never to be led astray or deteriorated. But, on the other hand, it does look as if the conscience, like every other faculty in our nature, may be led astray. It may become dull and obtuse, as, for instance, in heathen countries, where it may be satisfied with irrational creeds and unworthy ceremonies. It is notorious that the conscience is apt to fall into a slumberous state, and give little or no notice of temptation assailing us. In some cases it has become so perverted that it has declared evil to be good; it has declared persecution to be good, which it never is. In other cases it has declared good to be evil, declared kindness to enemies to be a crime. At times, as among robbers, it has sanctioned deeds that are cruel and revengeful. There are cases in which the conscience can be made to accuse itself and condemn its own acts. It seems clear to me that there are cases in which the lower passions of our nature are ever overmastering our moral perceptions. The Scriptures are right when they speak of the conscience as "defiled," as being "seared as with a hot iron."

It is clear that the conscience is placed in the very heart of our nature for a purpose—that it may be a prompter and monitor. Like the bee, it has its sweets, but it has also its sting. When it is obeyed willingly there is a glow of satisfaction. Its reproaches may become very fearful, disclosing to us the sins which have been committed, and the awful gulfs into which we may fall. The accusations of conscience may be the acutest of all the miseries to which we are exposed, lacerating us like the wild beasts, or stinging like innumerable insects.

It has its rewards. The deed enjoined having been done there is a glow of satisfaction. It has its penalties. The act enjoined having been opposed, or even neglected, we have a regret, a dissatisfaction, or a reproach, which disturbs and annoys us. In attending to what is commanded we are conscious that we are doing right, and have more or less anticipation that the consequences must be good. In disobeying we have an idea and a feeling more or less distinct of evil to come sooner or later.

The science is made up of the acts morally sanctioned or condemned. It has often been called Moral Philosophy because it arranges into a system the acts approved or disapproved.

Moral Law

Morality is fitly characterized by the phrase which Kant has constructed and employed, the Categorical Imperative. It is categorical in that it is definite. It allows certain acts. It prohibits others. But it is so designated chiefly in that it is imperative. It affirms of certain facts, not simply in the indicative mood that they are, or in the subjunctive mood that they may be, but in the imperative mood that they are to be done or that they are not to be done.

The moral law is authoritative. It issues orders, it issues prohibitions. It says thou shalt love God; thou shalt love thy fellow-man. It farther declares thou art sinning, that is, transgressing law; thou art not loving God, thou art not loving thy fellow-man as thou oughtest.

Our great ethical writer, Bishop Butler, deals especially with the authority of our moral nature. He shows not only that man has a conscience to discover the good and the evil, but that this conscience has authority, and supreme authority, that not only does it reign, but it reigns supreme, above every other power—above the intelligence, above the feelings.

Love

Love is one of the most important qualities which make an action good. Sometimes it is a general philanthropy extending to all persons and prompting us to do them good. More frequently it is an affection to families or individuals.

It may mingle with all other affections, and in doing so it gives them a moral character. It is capable of making the simplest actions good, even those acts which we perform from day to day and from hour to hour. It has a place in all the deeds that are truly virtuous, and imparts a virtuousness to them.

Having discovered God by the evident traces of design and law, we at once discover that we stand in a special relation to Him. He is our creator, preserver, and ruler; and we discover that we owe love and obedience to Him. I am convinced that He is the author, He is certainly the guardian of morality. We stand also in a close relation to our fellow-men. We owe them affection, and kind of service according to circumstances.

Love may manifest itself in two forms.

The Love of Complacency and Affection.—We delight in the object or person beloved...

The Love of Benevolence.—In this we not only delight in the contemplation and society of the persons loved; we wish well to them, we wish them all that is good, and so far as in our power we do them all that is good. We will oblige them if we can; we will serve them if it is in our power; we will watch for opportunities of promoting their welfare; we will make sacrifices for their welfare. This love is ready to flow toward relatives and friends, toward neighbors and companions, toward all with whom we come in contact; it will go out toward the whole family of mankind. We are ready to increase their happiness, and in the highest exercises of love to raise them in the scales of being and to exalt them morally and spiritually...

These two forms of love are not inconsistent with each other; they should always be united. Without the affection charity is felt to be cold. Without the benevolence the charity would be felt to be hypocritical. The two joined give us the full-orbed grace—all light and no shadow.

The Divine Existence

Man is led naturally to believe in God...We find a belief rising in us of the existence of God, and in doing so we know so much of His nature. We come to know Him as a moral God. We know that morality is defective when He has not a place in it, and is the very life of it. When God commands, morality is felt to be infallible and unchangeable. As these principles act the mind has a new idea not embraced in any other science; it is that of moral excellence. This claims to govern our whole nature.

The Combined Moral Principles

Morality is a concrete mass, the different aspects of which may be separately considered, but cannot be separated in fact. The Obligation prepares for the discovery of moral acts. It is the science of right and obligation. The Conscience actually reveals the acts as good or bad. The Law makes the acts imperative, and enjoins the precepts and prohibitions. There is always an appeal to God, and there is no appeal to a power beyond God. He is seated as on a watch-tower, and nothing escapes his notice. He looks down upon us as Christ looked upon the poor woman who threw her mite into the treasury, being all that she had. Morality is ever felt to be weak when it is not sanctioned by God.

The Will

It will be readily allowed that all good and all evil lie in the region of the Will. Now the essential element in Will is choice. But Will must include more than the mere resolution to act. It must embrace Wish, indeed all acts of selection or choice. It is only when the mind is thus exercised that the act can be called ours. When we wish or will that which is according to law the act can be called moral; when we wish or will that which is contrary to the law, the act is immoral...

The actions we perform in order to their being moral have been chosen by the performer. Till this is done the act can scarcely be said to be ours. When the choice is made the action is ours, and we may be regarded as responsible for it.

Evangelical Ethics

The principles enumerated all proceed on the idea that man has not violated them; in other words, that man has not sinned. But, in fact, man has not done what he ought to have done. He has not followed his moral obligations; he has not obeyed his conscience when it tells him what is right. He has not followed that law which is his rule of life. He has given offence to God. In other words, he has not conformed to those principles which are in his constitution. Nor is there in these principles any means of rectifying our nature.

But all this does not free man from the obligations which are still binding upon him. His conscience finds fault with his neglect; the law condemns him; God is angry with him. Still these regulating principles of our moral nature are not thereby cancelled or even lowered, but are as imperative as ever. The ethics that are binding on the perfect man are equally binding on the sinful man. We can draw a moral philosophy from man's fallen nature quite as readily as from his upright nature.

What is not made known by natural ethics is revealed in Scripture. The way is opened whereby the sinner becomes reconciled to God. Meanwhile the dignity of morality and its law are carefully preserved. Restoration is effected by what we should have done being done by another, who on the one hand is connected with God, and on the other hand becomes man. Christianity comes in with Redemption and Grace: with Redemption to relieve us from the past, with Grace to strengthen us for the future. All the old virtues— Honesty, Temperance, Charity, Love-are as binding as ever. But new ones, becoming our restored condition, are added; all implied in the original principles which we have been expounding. Then there are certain acts of humiliation becoming our position, such as distrust of ourselves, a sense of dependence. In particular there is Repentance, fully described in the Catechism of the Westminster divines as a grace in which the sinner, "out of a true sense of his sin and apprehension of the mercy of God in Christ, turns from it unto God...with full purpose of and endeavor after new obedience." Along with this there is encouragement. Such is Faith, which accepts of the offer and is itself accepted. From this emerge Hope, Love, and Protection in the future.

We have now an Evangelical service in the room of a moral obedience. Over all there is a clothing of Humility.

Sin

We live in a world where sin is more common than excellence. Sin is the neglect, or, more criminal, the violation of a law which we are bound to obey. That law is revealed unto us. We know that we ought to obey it. We know that we have not obeyed it, and that therefore we are sinners. This is the condition of every man. It is of unspeakable importance that we should know all this, but the majority of men do not know it. The consequence is, on the one hand they are in a dull, stupid state; not contented, but not knowing whence their discontent arises; or in a distracted state, feeling their need of peace and yet scarcely knowing how peace is to be had, and they look round for it. Such is the natural state of man. The very craving is an evidence of man being essentially a moral being.

Punishment

Our moral nature, especially the Conscience, which is the expression of our moral nature, determines that certain acts are evil; the same moral nature, with its adjuncts, especially the understanding, declares that certain acts should be punished.

The punishment has two ends in view. One is to mark disapprobation of the deeds; the other is premonitory, to prevent a recurrence of the offence. Both of these are kept in view by God, and are to be kept in view by man in the exercise of his power. In all cases God is to be regarded as the inflicter of punishment. This he accomplishes in this world or in the world to come. Every one has to appear before God in judgment, whether he has done good or done evil.

To the civil magistrate God has given a special power, to mark the crime and to prevent its recurrence. The individual citizen is not to take this power on himself, but to hand it over to the magistrate, who has to judge for himself, being always responsible to God. There are cases in which the culprit, if allowed to live, might endanger the lives of peaceful citizens, and in these preventive punishment should be rigorously inflicted.

Ethics Considered Objectively

Hitherto ethics have been viewed very much under a subjective aspect. They are, in fact, very much a mental process. But they have an objective side. External facts correspond to the internal facts and confirm them. One who pursues an honest and industrious course of life will commonly be successful, by the arrangement of Him who hath appointed all things. Outward propriety of conduct will commonly be accоmpаnied with peace and approbation. The idle man is almost always liable to fail. The cunning and deceitful man is apt to be viewed with distrust and suspicion. There is thus a correspondence between the internal feeling, good or bad, and the external circumstances. The morality within is sanctioned by the outward product. Both countenance that which is good and lay restraints on that which is evil. They conspire to show that man is a moral agent, and may contribute to moral excellence.

Happiness and Morality

There are two kinds of Good which we may seek: The one of these is Happiness, the other is Morality.

There is HAPPINESS. It may come from two distinct quarters. It may be got from external good, from bodily constitution, from health, from wealth and raiment, and from the blessings of life, whatever these may be.

Provided we violate no moral principle, provided we are all the while seeking for higher and moral ends, there is no impropriety, but the opposite, in seeking to promote our comfort or our higher felicity. When these blessings are bestowed upon us there is ground for gratitude to the Giver, which becomes a further source of contentment and felicity. The daily benefits we receive may, each of them being simple, be very small; but being continued and continuous, they become the main source of our happiness and the attractions which bind us to this world.

Both the promotion of Happiness and the Morality are obligatory.

Moral Excellence

We are examining our nature to hear what it says. It certainly allows that happiness may be sought, and enjoins it in various forms, say in comforts or in joys. But it as certainly says that there is at least one other thing to be sought, and that is moral excellence. There are times when these two come into collision; when men must either suffer or sin; must either tell a lie or lose a valuable property. Our moral nature decides that question at once, and cannot be made give any other answer than the one. It declares that we must keep our integrity and let everything else go.

There is gratitude for favors bestowed on us. There are the common civilities of life paid. There is special attention to those who are in need or who have claims upon us. There are the special demands of our home, of our relations, of the district, of our country. There are the claims which mankind have upon us, above all the duty of sending the Gospel to every creature, of making known the mercy of God to those who have sinned, and who therefore need it. These are ends which we should set before us habitually. In this way we are to fulfil the very ends of our being.

Justice

The definition of it is "his own to every one"...We are to give every man his rights, whatever they may be. Herbert Spencer in his volume on "Justice" goes so far as to include under it even the lower animals, who have certain rights which we are bound to attend to. Brutes are to be treated with forbearance and kindness...

But man has higher claims. Not only has he, like the brute creatures, a title to justice, but he is required as an intelligent being to give justice to the lower animals and to his fellow-man. This is a peculiarity of justice as a virtue on the part of man that he is bound to give justice to his fellow-men and to God. To God himself justice belongs as an essential attribute. All His creatures may expect from Him that which is right in time and in eternity.

Rights

On looking on the objects around us we feel that there are certain of them which we can claim as ours. Some, when traced to their source—indeed all of them—are by the appointment of God. Such are the light and rains, of which no one can lawfully deprive us. Some seem to be ours by the very nature of things; thus parents have to provide for their children and to see them educated. Some seem to be ours by the customs of the country, such as the right to decent burial. Such is our property generally—in wages or in inheritance, in land or money or stocks. We can claim these. No one has a right to deprive us of them. Under the same head may be placed all that we earn by bodily or mental exertion, by our talents or our industry, and also by our ingenuity and our character. These are rights which we can claim for ourselves, and which we are bound to allow in others.

Property

Almost every one has rights of some description given him by his father or mother, or earned by ability or industry on his own part. To these, when his right is established, he is entitled to adhere. No one has a right to deprive him of this property. If he parts with any portion of it, it is supposed by some equivalent being granted.

But to this same head belong some other things which men value; there belong, in particular, his character, his reputation. These constitute his property; they belong to him, and he may turn them to whatever use he sees fit, and earn by them other property such as money or land or higher reputation. By this means society is bound together by bonds which impart confidence to the operations which are carried on, and tend to carry on these still farther, till society is bound together in a way which cannot readily be broken.

Benevolence and Justice

Both are allowed, both are required, each according to what is demanded in the circumstances. All men seek happiness, and God delights to bestow it. But there is another good which we ought to seek, and that is moral excellence.

There are times when we can have both. There is first health and happiness. There is also moral personal goodness. It is to be understood that when we can have both without any conflict we may seek and obtain both. But when there is a contest and conflict, which is to give way? Our nature properly interpreted decides that question in the name of conscience and of God. The phrases good and right are applied to this high decision, the former denoting the love, the latter more especially the law.

In respect of the claims which Justice and Beneficence have upon us there is no difference. I am bound to pay a certain sum to this poor man for the work done for me. Not only so, but, as he cannot sustain himself and is my neighbor, I am bound to give him a decent sum in charity.

For the debt I owe him I am required to give the man a certain sum. But the obligation to charity is not thus definite. I am bound to give in charity to the poor, but how much-a dollar or a pound or ten pounds-this is left to myself. In this way God would sift and try us to make us manifest how much love or charity there is in us. This difference is often expressed by the distinction drawn between duties "of perfect and imperfect obligation." We must carefully distinguish between the two, between a debt and charity, and we must be particularly careful not to reduce the rigid form of the former to the looser form of the less stringent. Both duties are to be performed. In both we are responsible to God.

Summum Bonum

The phrase was used by the ancients. It can be understood by us. It denotes the highest excellence.

I am not sure that it should be applied to mere happiness, even the highest and the purest. It would be more appropriately employed in speaking of the highest moral excellence. It may be most appropriately used when it leads to and is accompanied with the purest happiness. This is a bonum which all may seek to attain, and it is the summum bonum.

Virtuous Acts

As the result of these various discussions we should be able to determine what is the nature of virtue or moral excellence. Certainly Love is an element in it. It may not be there consciously; but it is there in action. This is not all: there is also Law. The two combined give us virtuous action. Both are voluntary, though the voluntary action may be very much unobserved.

In ordinary cases there is no analysis by us of the elements. The whole is one noble impulse. The law presents us with the form, the love gives the wings. This is always, or almost always, accompanied by feeling. This diffuses the sentiment throughout the soul and finds exit in lively affection.

The good man exercises love habitually. Under this becoming temper it becomes a habit or second nature to him. Were the great body of mankind under these guiding motives, the world would show an entirely different aspect. The various powers of the mind-sensitive, intellectual, and emotive-would come under one high motive. Corresponding actions would come forth to confirm the character and flow forth in beneficent acts.

Morality and Our Natural Faculties

There are some who would explain all morality by the use of the ordinary faculties of the mind. According to a very general opinion, morality is supposed to consist of feelings only. This is so far a mistake. The exercise of our native powers is not in itself either virtuous or vicious any more than is the growth of the plant and animal. There is no morality in the senses, in the understanding or in the feelings, considered in themselves, though they all may be made moral or immoral according to the use made of them.

The senses have no morality directly, though they should be made to serve what is good. It is the office of the understanding to determine the precise nature of the acts. It will always be held that there is something defective in morality when no feeling is excited. But it is by a special moral power, by the power which discerns the good and the evil, that morality is discerned. When thus sanctioned the understanding and the feelings come in to aid the conscience and to render the moral ideas more clear and lively.

The Sabbath

Most of the duties we have to perform are imposed upon us by our moral nature, as, for example, to speak the truth and be honest in all our transactions. But some are enjoined positively by God. Of this character is the weekly Sabbath...It is found that even the lower animals require it; horses, for instance, are apt to break down prematurely if made to draw heavy loads all days of the week. It has been an unspeakable privilege both to men's bodies and souls. All men and women require it to save them from incessant toil, and from the sinking down of both body and spirit. The observance of the Sabbath has thus become a moral and not a mere positive injunction. The Sabbath has been a great blessing to individuals, as giving them a time of rest from toil, and for higher exercises, and preparation for a better country, and to the community generally as giving leisure and motive for reflection and devotedness to God.

Duties to God

From the above Principles and Ideas certain practical acts are derived. These are Duties—something due, something to be paid.

These are so numerous that we must arrange them under heads, so as to be able to remember and employ them. Upon the whole the old and scriptural classification is the most intelligible and convenient. We are to live soberly, righteously, and godly. This would give us the division, only reversing the order, into the duties we owe to God, the duties we owe to our fellowmen, into the duties we owe to ourselves.

It may be difficult at times to carry out this division. Some of the duties of life might be put in more than one of the classes. In a sense all of them might be regarded as duties we owe God, who is supreme. This truth should always be carried with us, to induce us to do all our actions to God and thus sanctify them. But there are duties which we owe specially to our fellow-men, and duties we owe to ourselves. Some of the duties we owe to ourselves we owe also to our neighbors, such as charity. In such cases all we have to do is to make a statement to this effect, say by placing the duty under two or more heads.

Beginning with our duties to God, Chalmers goes so far as to speak (" Natural Theol.," p. 56) of the duties laid upon us by the probability or even the imagination of a God. In our breasts, moving knowingly or unconsciously, there are prognostications of a superior power which prompt us to seek further till we discover the clear evidence of the existence of God and of His holy and righteous character. These prognostications we should not seek to repress, but rather follow them till they lead us to a satisfactory result, till they show us clearly the evidence of design and the proof of the existence of a Supreme Being of intelligence and wisdom, of purity and love. It is one of the highest offices of the imagination that it is ever prompting us to this, if we do not resist but rather follow it as a grand impulse.

As we contemplate the character of God as seen in His works, we feel that we ought to cherish toward Him at all times a reverent and devout feeling. This we owe to Him from His holy character and the relation in which we stand to Him, in whom we live and move and have our being. We owe this to Him from our weakness and our dependence upon him. In particular we owe Him worship. I do not know whether the precise form of worship is in all cases prescribed. We must take care to have it simple; and we must secure that its splendor does not suppress its sincerity. An essential part of it is Praise, in which we exalt the Divine Being, and in doing so the feelings of admiration and love are called forth in our own breasts.

Another essential part is Prayer. "Prayer is the offering of our desires unto God for things agreeable to His will, with confession of our sins and thankful acknowledgment of His mercy"... Believing in the existence of God, and knowing His character, it is clearly our duty to pay Him some acknowledgment. We have to thank Him for His constant kindness and His precious gifts. We have to acknowledge our many sins of heart, of speech, and behavior. All this implies a regular appeal and a perpetual communion with God. As it is due to Him so it is good for us thus to unbosom ourselves to Him. At times we may be obliged to make our prayers secret, without the use of words. But in all cases where it can be done we should use words in our petitions, as this makes our prayers definite and expressive.

Natural religion does not say from what quarters our public prayers are to be taken, from a prepared book of devotion or from extemporaneous expression. The former method is more apt to be precise and systematic, the latter to give a more free expression to the outpouring of the heart. A judicious combination of the two methods may often be the more expedient. In all cases formality is to be carefully avoided. Care must be taken to have public prayers express the wants of those who pray...

God has evidently causes in this world in which He is deeply interested. We are to seek out these, inquire what they imply, and carry them on as far as may be in our power. There are missions of various sorts. There is the conviction and conversion of sinners, and the prosperity of the church and its several branches. There is the suppression of vice, there is the propagation of morality throughout the world, or in some particular district in which we feel an interest. There is the cause of missions, domestic and foreign. There are causes which God favors and which He expects us to favor by giving our personal services or our money to their support. We are thus to labor till we secure for God the highest place in His own world and over all that world.

In general we are at once to obey whenever He has uttered a command, whatever be the sacrifice which we are required to make. The announcement may be made by the conscience as the vicegerent of God; or it may be a command of Scripture. It may be an order to sell all that we have, and give to the poor, or to promote some good cause. All that we have to assure ourselves of is that it is the will of God, and then obedience should instantly follow.

It is utterly inconceivable that God, who is above all, and is of a perfectly holy character, should require of us what is injurious to our best interests. He may require of us what are great sacrifices at the time, but which in the end will have greatly overbalancing recompenses.

False Systems

The Scriptures everywhere condemn false religious systems which existed in their day, such as the worship of false gods. We are to do the same in regard to errors which prevail in our times.

Materialism.—It is depriving us and it is depriving God of one of the most essential of his perfections. It makes us and it makes Him a mass of matter of which we have no proof that it can think, that it can judge or reason, or that it can discover the relation of means and end. We perceive God everywhere performing acts which show that he is a spirit.

Pantheism is depriving God of one of his highest perfections, of his personality. We possess this power, and should value it highly. We have received it from God, and must believe that He himself possesses it.

Utilitarianism.—It makes us look merely to happiness. It says that the highest duty is to provide for the greatest happiness of the greatest number. But the affairs of this world are so complicated that it is often difficult, at times impossible, to tell whether any given act is fitted to promote this end. What is meant to do so may turn out the very opposite, it may bring with it misery and not felicity.

Duties to Our Fellow-Men

We are to have a respect toward man as man. We are to honor all men. We are specially to have a sympathy with them in joy and sorrow. We are to rejoice with them that rejoice, and weep with them that weep.

We are to love our neighbors as we love ourselves. What is the meaning of this? We have in our natures an instinctive love toward ourselves. This is appointed, and may be appealed to as the standard of love which we should cherish toward others.

This affection, when cherished, lifts us above Selfishness, into which we are so apt to fall, above Resentment, above Murmuring at the success of others, above Envy, above Scandal, above Spitefulness. We would not do any of these to ourselves, and duty requires that we do not any of them toward others. " We are to do unto others as we would that they should do unto us." Cherishing love toward all, we are to be looking out and waiting for opportunities of doing them good.

Cherishing these affections I think it is allowable to have differences in rank in the wealth possessed. This allows of a stimulus to people to rise in the world. It tends also to produce a higher style of manners among the upper classes, which stimulates the lower classes to seek to reach a like elevation. We must be careful not to carry these distinctions too far, lest we oppress the poorer classes. If I do not mistake the signs of the times, one of the burning questions in the social contest will be the inequalities of station.

We begin with Integrity. It is of importance that the young should start with a thorough spirit of uprightness. Without this the conduct will be crooked and untrustworthy, and a spirit of suspicion and discontent will be gendered. The character of the man will suffer greatly by losing openness and frankness, and will go on to further excesses of the same kind, employing one deception to conceal another. The result is that suspicion will prevail throughout the community. Calumny of every kind is to be avoided, and a charitable rather than a harsh spirit is to be cherished, and it will come out in the habitual expression to others.

Veracity.—It is of vast moment, both to the individual and the community, that there should be a spirit of truthfulness prevalent. Without this we would not know what to believe and what not to believe, and a universal suspicious temper would be engendered. Children are to be specially trained to sincerity and truth-speaking in all circumstances. When this spirit is abroad it gives a wholesome breath to society and sweetens the intercourse which human beings have with one another. Various good ends may be accomplished which cannot be gained when there is a general spirit of jealousy and suspicion...

Property.—God has bestowed upon us certain powers and gifts which no one is at liberty to take from us or to interfere with. All attempts to deprive us of them is theft. Under the same head may be placed all purposes to deprive us of the right to earn property or to use it as we see fit. Honesty has ever been esteemed by people generally as one of the greatest of all virtues. The laws protecting it have been one of the greatest boons that can be conferred on man.

Under the same head may be placed our character and influence. They are property, and we have a right to retain them and make a good use of them for our own good and that of others.

The Duties of Communities.—Mankind are required by their position to form themselves into communities, such as nations, towns, commercial companies, and clubs of various sorts. But no such association should be formed or joined where there is any illegal act to be done. On the supposition that all the requirements are lawful, there should be a rigid performance of duties to the members of the society and others with whom they stand in relation. There has been in America of late years a jealousy of trusts, which should always be carefully watched.

The moral law is binding on communities, as it is upon single persons. It is a fact that there are persons who commit, as members of a society, unjust deeds which they would shrink from as private persons.

Esprit de corps, which serves some good purposes, may often be encouraged in the spirit which pervades a body of soldiers or a class of students; but it must not be carried so far in any case as thereby to injure individuals.

Masters and Servants.—Servants have to give such service as was understood at their engagement—this to be determined by custom or the law of the country. Masters and mistresses should have respect both to the best interests and feelings of their dependents. We all know how masters, and especially mistresses, are apt to complain of their servants. But the fault may lie in the caprice of those who are in authority. They should realize that the poor and dependent have also rights which are to be rigidly attended to. They should have liberty of thought and of religious worship. The good master or mistress commonly gets in the end good servants, who, as a rule, are apt to remain with those who are considerate and kind to them.

The Family.—Mankind are bound to form themselves into families for the good of the race, for its felicity, and for its welfare. There are duties binding on both father and mother. Both have to take care of the young, to see that their wants are supplied for the present, and that they are trained to a useful occupation for their future lives. Every one, even the rich, should have some work to do. It was a good custom of the ancient Jews that every one should have an employment; we find that the Apostle Paul, though of a good family, was a tent-maker.

There are duties devolving on children. They have to show affection to parents; they have to give obedience to them, except in cases where their commands are seen to be clearly contrary to the higher demands of God.

Brothers and sisters clearly owe affection and a degree of kindness to one another, and should be showing this perpetually. This interest should extend to more distant relationship, as far indeed as affection may be extended, or as far as special love is not lost in a general philanthropy.

The Sexual Relationships.—These are meant to add to our comforts, and are necessary for the continuation of the race. But they are apt to run into perilous excess, and need to be carefully guarded and limited. This is specially required in order to the upbringing of children, having a respect both to their bodily welfare and also to their training and character. The special restraint on the evils is marriage, which ought to be carefully guarded by law. "Marriage," says Dr. Dorner, " is the union of two persons of opposite sexes in the most intimate fellowship of body and soul—a fellowship in which each personality has its deficiencies supplied and both together form a higher unity." It is essentially monogamous and indissoluble, and only as such can it be morally contracted. "The positive condition is that there should be free choice and inward inclination, that is, that the two persons be ready to give themselves unreservedly to each other." There should only be one wife or one husband, that there may not be jealousies and quarrels, not a divided but one affection.

Divorces are becoming shamefully prevalent in various countries. They can be allowed morally only from causes which virtually abrogate the relationship: by unfaithfulness to the marriage tie or by wilful and proven abandonment. They should not be allowed from any other cause. If they take place otherwise, the parties should be punished.

Law and special marks of disgrace must be applied to adultery, to incest, to self-pollution, and unnatural crimes, as corrupting the individual and introducing immeasurable disorder and misery into the household.

Our Irascible Affections.—Our Maker has endowed us with such affections which commonly show themselves in some form of temper, as quick or violent or sulky. They serve some good purposes. They may preserve us from insults or ill-usage of various sorts; may act like the prickles which grow on certain kinds of plants and keep them from being meddled with. But they are to be carefully watched and guarded...A prevailing love is to be ready to keep all irritations within proper bounds...

To the Churches

I speak of them in the plural number, for they are now very numerous. It should be distinctly understood that though they somewhat resemble each other, and both claim authority, yet the two, Church and State, are not the same. The temptation on the part of the Romish Church is to claim authority over the state. The disposition of some of the Protestant churches is to make the church subject to the state. The true position of the two is, that each should have its own position. The churches should rule in all spiritual matters, in expounding dactrine and in enjoining church orders. But the church should not meddle with money or temporalities of any kind, except incidentally to secure buildings or stipends to its ministers. On the other hand, the civil magistrate is not at liberty to interfere in spiritual matters, in the government or services of the church. It is quite possible that the two should so far unite, each maintaining its own independence. But the tendency of the present day is rather to keep the two entirely separate, both favoring peace and high morality in a country.

The State

The existence of government and of laws with power of execution is a necessity. Without these, and with every man following the impulses of his nature, original and acquired, this world would be in a state of disquiet, disorder, and crime. If people have not a government ready-made for them, they must proceed to construct one.

In fact, government is of divine appointment, being of arrangements made by God. All the arrangements in our world seem to point to this, and to show that man must have some sort of national government. True, it is not determined either by the religion of nature or of the Bible what the nature of that government should be a monarchy, an aristocracy, or a democracy, or a mixture of the three or of any two of them. This seems to be left to the judgment of mankind and the providential circumstances in which they are placed. But whatever be the form taken, it should always bear a reference to the divine authority. In this way a due place may be given both to the agency of God and the agency of man. But to the government, however formed, there must always be strict obedience rendered, it being always understood that the government keeps within its own province, having to do with men's lives and their property. Smuggling of every sort must be regarded as unlawful and liable to be punished, as it is interfering with the nation's means of support. Everything should be provided which promotes peace and order, and everything which tends to war or discontent should be discountenanced and removed.

At times it may be important to have the legislature or the very form of government changed. It is not easy to state in definite terms when a subject may resist a government and seek to overturn it. It is time to inquire into the subject when any individual rights, civil or religious, are interfered with. When this is done in any form obedience is not required. In no case should a change of government, especially by violent means, be attempted, except when there is good reason to believe that the government that succeeds is better than that which has been displaced.

War

We should never allow ourselves to look on war except with deep solemnity. In it thousands or tens of thousands of men are seeking to destroy each other. But there are cases in which war becomes necessary in stirring up a spirit of independence in opposition to oppression. It calls forth the highest feelings of bravery, and is the subject of the noblest songs which we sing. But in all cases one of the parties at least is in the wrong, and in most cases both parties are in the wrong, and are responsible for the blood that flows. In all cases before engaging in war we are to enquire calmly and resolutely whether the party we espouse is in the right. In these days disputes are settled more by arbitration, and it is to be hoped that the number of wars will be fewer.

Duties to Ourselves

People imagine that they can do what they please with themselves, can follow any whim or caprice, can gratify any taste or pursue any line of conduct. But it is not so we are under law to God.

We are to attend to our bodies, we are to control and guide our eating and drinking, and to regulate the exercise which we take and the air which we breathe.

Self-cultivation is a special duty. So far as God allows, we are to improve every faculty which God has given. If there be any special gift which He has bestowed—say of philosophy, or poetry, or science; of business, or calculation, or discovery in travelling—we must reckon that as a call on the part of God specially to engage in it. Hugh Miller told me that if a man had great talents as a stone-mason, he should follow the trade. The gifts of genius are never to be neglected. When they are wanting, the want must be supplied by industry and application. Were these duties attended to, the world would advance steadily from age to age in all that is great and good.

The individual acts devolving on us are too many to be enumerated. But there is a general spirit to be cultivated which will issue in the acts. There is to be a love shown to all mankind in the various positions in which we may be placed. This is a duty which we owe to our fellow-men and to God, but which we also owe to ourselves, in order to secure the influence which we ought to exercise. There is to be an independence in forming our opinions, and courage in carrying them out. There is a virtue which we owe to God and our fellow-men and women, but which we owe specially to ourselves—it is that of chastity under every form.

Beginning in early life, we should seek to acquire good and permanent habits, especially habits of self-command, habits of industry, habits of perseverance, habits of thorough integrity, habits of charity. As the result of these we will attain and maintain character. This will prevent us from vacillation or departing from the line we have chosen. It is for this purpose that the law of habit is given us, that it may keep us upright and stable. All this becoming known to our fellow-men, they will respect us and not suspect us of hypocrisy or deceit of any kind. Our character will come in the end to stand as a tower which no one has the courage to attack.

But in order to accomplish these ends it is not enough to proceed at random or by impulse; this can never produce any lasting effect of a beneficent character. There must special attention be given to habits of temperance, meaning thereby not mere abstinence from intemperance or intoxicants, but in the government of our nature, of the tongue, and of all our lusts and passions. All these should be pressed upon us till they become parts of our being. When this is done in a community there is sure to be a general spirit of morality.

We are bound to take all steps to preserve our own life as we do that of others. He who takes his own existence is doing what he has no authority to do. He is betraying a very precious and solemn trust which has been committed to him. He is, in fact, guilty of murder.

Nor let him say, as the suicide often does, that his vocation, that his usefulness is gone, and that there is no use in preserving what can only be an incumbrance. In fact, we are not in circumstances to say when our usefulness is gone. Though at present incapable of doing what we wish, the time may come when we can accomplish our ends, or more important ends than we contemplate.

It may be, one of the greatest ends which we can succeed in carrying out is to show how patiently, how magnanimously we can bear up under the depression and trials to which we are exposed. It is cowardly to flee when we should fight. The very highest purposes may be effected by our being subjected to annoyances and humiliations, in bearing up against which we may accomplish the very noblest ends.

In all cases it lies not with us, but with One who sees the end from the beginning, to determine how long we are to hold by our position, which we are not to abandon till God dismisses us.

The Consummation

We have shown that man is a moral agent, that he can discern between good and evil, and that he is responsible to God for his opinions and his acts. We carry this power with us wherever we go. As we do so it exalts us in the scale of beings. We have within us ideas and axioms which elevate us far above surroundings, above inanimate nature, and above the lower creatures that serve us.

Joseph Cook

Certainties of the Soul and Speculations of Science

Joseph Cook, 1881

The Soul in Harmony with Its Environment

The best posture of mind is that which seeks first, not orthodoxy, but clearness. Of course, truth is immeasurably the highest object of consideration; but, when we say we must seek truth first, such is the subtle action of prejudice, that truth is commonly understood to mean __my__ truth, not __your__ truth. Therefore let us first seek clearness, and not your truth or my truth. Clearness will not mislead us if we set it up as a goal; but our prejudgments as to what truth is may easily do so. Let us be true to the scientific method, and truth will take care of itself. Let us seek primarily to be distinct and straightforward, and only secondly to be orthodox or heterodox. Let us not confuse ourselves with the slightest partisan prejudice. Let us keep all creeds out of our minds as much as possible, and seek first, midst, last, all that Intuition, Instinct, Experiment, and Syllogism can teach us, or perfect loyalty to the scientific method.

I affirm that if there is a God, and if He is not a malevolent being, He not only has made a best way to live, but has made it sure that it is best to live the best way. He wills our perfection; and if He is a benevolent being, He will not only give us a religion that will carry us to perfection, but He will make it so plain, that he who runs may read, if he will. Wherever in the forest a man wishes you to drop down in despair, there recall and recite the great Credo: That God wills man's perfection; that man cannot be perfect without a perfect religion; and that therefore God will give man a perfect religion, so clear that it will be the light that lighteth every man that cometh into the world. While I hold to a belief in God's goodness, I must believe, although I cannot know the map of all the forest, that there is a way home, and that I can find the path back to my Father's house.

…Democratic ages can never be taught __ex cathedra__. All men must think for themselves; and so all men must be taught how to think. It is, therefore, worth while for public educated discussion to put in the foreground axioms, self-evident truths, intuitions, instincts, or the nature of things, and to let men see that, after all, the great truths we cannot help believing are the things of most importance to us…if we can cause them to feel that their consciences are the touch of God within them, or of a Somewhat and Some One in, but not of us, we shall slowly bring them to believe that these axioms, these consti­tutional instincts, these ineradicable moral beliefs are, and were meant to be, a clue to the path that leads into the King's Highway, and brings men into the land on which the sun never sets.

…man's philosophic and moral restlessness proves that, without violence to self-evident truth, he has found no way of harmonising himself by his own excellence, or solely by his own good works, with his entire environment, including conscience, God, and a record of deliberate sin in an irreversible past.

…__Moral as well as physical law has unity and universality__…If you play fast and loose with axioms, you have a task larger than that of Sisyphus on your hands to prove that you know anything. You know that you know that nothing can be known. How do you know that you know? The time has come when we must teach the outlines of the philosophy of axioms, or self-evident truths…A little philosophy is in all men's minds, and it is a dangerous thing. The Castalian spring must be made to run through democratic ages in streams large enough to quench the thirst of multitudes, otherwise there will be trouble.

Joseph Joubert

Some of the “Thoughts” of Joseph Joubert

[Joseph Joubert.] Translated by George H. Calvert. Boston: William V. Spencer, 1867.pdf`. Locators: chapter + page of this Calvert edition. Companion feeder — Calvert wording only.

Ch. III. Of Man, of Organs, the Soul and the Intellectual Faculties (p. 47)

The more I think on it, the more I see that the intellect is something outside of the soul, as the hands are outside of the body, the eyes outside of the head, the branches outside of the trunk. It helps to do more, but not to be more.

Ch. III. Of Man, of Organs, the Soul and the Intellectual Faculties (p. 49)

Is there any thing better than judgment? Yes: the gift of insight, the eye of the mind, the instinct of penetration, the prompt discernment, in short, the natural sagacity to discover all that is spiritual.

It is to imagination that the greatest truths are revealed: for example, Providence, its march, its purposes; they escape our judgment; the imagination alone sees them.

Ch. IV. Of the Nature of Minds (p. 51)

We measure minds by their stature; it would be better to estimate them by their beauty.

The tendency towards good, the quickness to grasp it, and the constancy in wishing it; the intensity, suppleness, and tenacity of the springs which this tendency puts into play; the liveliness, force, and precision of the efforts towards the end aimed at, are the elements which, like so many letters, form, by their combinations, the intrinsic gauge of the man and determine his value.

Nature has made two kinds of excellent minds: the one to produce beautiful thoughts and beautiful actions, the other to admire them.

Ch. IV. Of the Nature of Minds (pp. 52–53)

To be interested in small things as in great, to be apt and ready for the one as for the other, is not weakness and littleness, but capacity and sufficiency.